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The Constitution and School
Desegregation: An Inquiry Into the
Nature of the Substantive Right
By ROBERT ALLEN SEDLER*
INTRODUCTION**
The purpose of this article is to inquire into the nature of
the substantive right conferred by the Constitution with re-
spect to school desegregation. School desegregation refers to
the operation of racially integrated schools by the state.1 A
racially integrated school is one that has both a substantial
number of black students2 and a substantial number of white
students in attendance. The opposite of a racially integrated
*Professor of Law, Wayne State University. A.B., J.D., University of Pittsburgh.
**It is particularly fitting that this article be published in a symposium honoring
Professor Paul Oberst. During the years 1966-1977, when I was on the faculty of the
University of Kentucky College of Law, Paul Oberst was a valued colleague, a wise
mentor, and a close friend. While our friendship has continued after I left the faculty,
I miss our day-to-day association very much. Many of the ideas expressed in this
article, as well as many of the ideas I have expressed in other writings, were first
explored in discussions with Paul Oberst. For many years, Paul Oberst has been in
the forefront of the struggle for racial equality and human rights. His long history of
involvement in that struggle was an inspiration to me, and he shared generously of
his experience and his wisdom. I owe very much to him. This article is a small way of
expressing my personal tribute and appreciation to this outstanding teacher, scholar,
lawyer, civic leader-and very good friend.
' For constitutional purposes, it is the state that is responsible for the operation
of the schools regardless of how the authority is allocated internally within the state.
This article will generally refer to the "state" when discussing constitutional require-
ments and to the "school authorities" when discussing actions taken within a particu-
lar school system.
2 The reference to black students throughout this writing is intended to include
Hispanic students, since Hispanics, like blacks, have been subject to discrimination
and victimization in American society because the dominant majority has perceived
them as "nonwhite." See the discussion in Sedler, Beyond Bakke: The Constitution
and Redressing the Social History of Racism, 14 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 133, 133 n.3
(1979) [hereinafter referred to as Beyond Bakke]. The combined black and Hispanic
enrollment of a school properly can be considered in determining whether that school
is racially identifiable. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 197-98 (1973). De-
pending on the situation prevailing in the particular school system, blacks and His-
panics are likely to be attending the same schools, as in Keyes, or there may be both
predominantly black schools and predominantly Hispanic schools. See, e.g., United
States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 467 F.2d 848 (5th Cir. 1972).
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school is a racially identifiable school, one that is attended
only or almost entirely by children of one race so that it would
be perceived objectively as a "one race," and in this sense, a
"segregated" school.3 Focusing on objective racial iden-
tifiability avoids the necessity of using a racial percentage ra-
tio for definitional purposes and accords with the situation
that exists in most school systems where desegregation efforts
have not been undertaken. Most of the schools in the system
will either be almost entirely "one-race" schools or will have
such a high percentage of children of one race that they will
be perceived objectively as "one-race" schools. The relatively
few other schools in the system, regardless of their particular
racial percentage, may be considered as racially integrated
schools. 5
The model for our analysis is a school system that enrolls
substantial numbers of both black children and white chil-
dren, so that, as regards available students, all or most of the
schools in the system could be operated as racially integrated
3 A racially identifiable black school is a school that is attended only by black
children or has so few white children in attendance in relation to black children in
attendance that it would be perceived objectively as a "black" school. A racially iden-
tifiable "white" school would exhibit the same attendance pattern in reverse. Since
whites substantially outnumber blacks in most school systems, or where this is not so
in a particular urban school system, in the metropolitan area, it takes proportionately
fewer blacks than whites to integrate a particular school. So if a school system were
approximately one-third black in student enrollment, for example, a school with at
least 10% black students could be considered an integrated school, particularly if
many other schools in the system were virtually all white. But a school with only 10%
white students, in light of the black-white ratio of the school system, would be con-
sidered a racially identifiable black school.
4 "Racial balance" relates to the black-white ratio of the school system as a
whole, and a school is considered to be "racially imbalanced" when it deviates from
the systemwide ratio by a prescribed amount. See the discussion in Swann v. Char-
lotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 22-25 (1971). As to the distinction be-
tween racial identifiability and "racial balance," see also the discussion in Sedler,
Book Review, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 645, 648-49 (1977) (reviewing L. GRAGLIA, DIASTER
By DECREE 122-26 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as Book Review). Racial integration.
for constitutional purposes involves racial identifiability and not "racial balance."
In Dayton, Ohio, for example, when a school desegregation suit was filed in
1971, the school system enrollment was 44% black. Of the 69 schools in the system,
21 were 90% or more black while 28 were 90% or more white. 75.9% of the black
students were assigned to those 21 schools. Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433
U.S. 406 (1977).
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schools.' This is the model that prevails in most school sys-
tems enrolling substantial numbers of black children. How-
ever, there are some urban school systems that have now be-
come so heavily black in enrollment that even with maximum
dispersement of white students, it would not be possible to
integrate very many of the schools in the system. These
school systems, of course, are surrounded by predominantly or
virtually all-white suburban school systems, and in all metro-
politan areas, the school population is composed of a white
majority.8 Thus, in terms of available students, the schools in
the metropolitan area could be racially integrated if urban-
suburban school district lines were to be crossed., How the
nature of the substantive right and the state's corresponding
obligation is affected by the existence of separate school dis-
tricts within the same metropolitan area will also be consid-
ered. However, the basic analytical model will be the school
district that enrolls substantial numbers of both black chil-
dren and white children, and the analysis will develop prima-
rily with reference to intradistrict desegregation.
The first section of this article analyzes the nature of the
substantive right as it has been defined by the Supreme
6 This refers to the first year that the desegregation plan goes into effect. Under
the present state of the law, there is no requirement to adjust for population changes
once desegregation is achieved, even if as a result of those changes, some schools
again become racially identifiable. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S.
424 (1976).
7 Detroit and Atlanta are the clearest examples of this situation. See Milliken v.
Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Milliken 1]; Calhoun v. Cook,
522 F.2d 717 (5th Cir. 1975). See also the discussion in Sedler, Metropolitan Desegre-
gation in the Wake of Milliken - On Losing Big Battles and Winning Small Wars:
The View Largely from Within, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 535, 538-40 [hereinafter referred
to as Metropolitan Desegregation].
s In the Detroit metropolitan area, for example, the school population was ap-
proximately 80% white at the time of Milliken L See 418 U.S. at 765 n.1 (White, J.,
dissenting).
9 In New York City, the degree of racial concentration is so extensive that effec-
tive systemwide desegregation cannot be achieved within the school system itself. But
desegregation has been ordered in Los Angeles despite its sprawling size. See Craw-
ford v. Bd. of Educ., 551 P.2d 28 (Cal. 1976). Presumably desegregation can be
achieved in most of the other metropolitan areas in the country. As to the feasibility
of metropolitan desegregation, see also Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977) (Louisville-Jefferson County,
Kentucky).
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Court's current doctrine. As will be seen, under the Court's
current doctrine, the nature of the substantive right relates to
the situation prevailing in the school system in which the
child is enrolled, and it is a right to attend school in a system
in which there presently exist no vestiges of de jure segrega-
tion.10 The second part of the article focuses on the right of
children to attend racially integrated schools. The inquiry is
in terms of whether the values embodied in the Constitution
require recognition of a substantive right relating to attend-
ance at racially integrated schools, and if so, as to what is the
scope of the state's obligation to provide for racially inte-
grated schools.1
I. THE PRESENT NATURE OF THE RIGHT: THE SCHOOL
SYSTEM AND DE JURE SEGREGATION
The Supreme Court's current doctrine regarding the con-
stitutionality of the operation of racially identifiable schools
by the state has evolved with reference to the circumstances
prevailing in the school system in which children are enrolled.
The substantive right that has emerged is a right to attend
school in a school system in which there presently exist no
vestiges of de jure segregation. This doctrine has assimilated
fully for purposes of constitutional analysis the segregation
existing in school systems located in states where segregation
was required by state law at the time of Brown v. Board of
Education 2 and the segregation existing in school systems lo-
cated in states where it was not so required. The major com-
ponents of the doctrine are de jure segregation
-governmental responsibility for the existence of racially
identifiable schools in the system-and the affirmative duty to
10 For a discussion of de jure segregation, see notes 52-67 infra and accompany-
ing text.
" The author's "academic perspective" has admittedly been affected by his "ad-
versary involvement" as counsel for the plaintiffs in school desegregation cases. He is
currently litigating a school desegregation case in Akron, Ohio, and in the past has
litigated cases in Louisville-Jefferson County, Kentucky; Lexington-Fayette County,
Kentucky; Charleston, Missouri, and metropolitan Atlanta, Georgia. As to the effect
of "adversary involvement" on "academic perspective," see the discussion in Sedler,
Metropolitan Desegregation, supra note 7, at 537 n.9.
12 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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eliminate fully all vestiges of de jure segregation from the
system.
We will first consider the development of that doctrine
with respect to segregation existing in school systems located
in states where segregation was required by state law at the
time of Brown, and secondly, consider its extension to segre-
gation existing in school systems located in states where such
segregation was not required. Finally, we will analyze that
doctrine and query the soundness of a constitutional approach
that looks to the situation prevailing in the school system in
which the child is enrolled rather than to the situation of the
child who is compelled to attend a racially identifiable school.
A. Segregation Required by State Law
We subsequently will discuss at length the rationale of
the Court's decisions in Brown1 and Bolling v. Sharpe.1 4 For
present purposes, it is sufficient to note that the Court held
unconstitutional the state and federal laws mandating racial
segregation in the schools, and the segregation resulting from
those laws was considered to be de jure and subject to redress.
In the years following Brown, the Court's concern was with
defining what constituted an adequate conversion from the
constitutionally impermissible dual school system that was
mandated by state law to a unitary school system in which
"state-imposed segregation has been completely removed." 15
In Green v. County School Board,1 6 decided in 1968, the
Court held that a "freedom of choice" plan was not an ade-
quate means of converting to a unitary school system where it
did not in fact succeed in eliminating the racial identifiability
of the schools in the system.1 7 The Court's effective invalida-
23 Id.
14 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
15 Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). For a discussion of the
development of school desegregation law in the period from Brown to Green, see
Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since Brown v. Board of
Education, 39 L. & Contemp. Prob., 7, 10-28 (1975); Wilkinson, The Supreme Court
and Southern School Desegregation, 1955-1970: A History and Analysis, 64 VA. L.
REv. 486, 505-37 (1978).
16 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
7 The Court emphasized that the duty of the school authorities was "to convert
1979-801
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tion of "freedom of choice" plans in Green and related cases18
insured that children living in nonurban school systems in the
southern and border states would in fact be attending racially
integrated schools, since black and white populations were
generally dispersed throughout the system, and geographic at-
tendance zoning would produce racially integrated schools.
But the duty of the state was framed with reference to the
situation existing in the school system rather than with refer-
ence to the right of the children to attend racially integrated
schools.19
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion,20 decided in 1971, the Court again framed the duty in
light of the situation existing in the school system. Swann
held that in a school system located in a state where segrega-
tion had been required by state law, geographic attendance
zoning was an insufficient means of converting from a dual
school system to a unitary one where, following assignment on
that basis, a large number of racially identifiable schools re-
mained. The rationale for the Court's holding was the rela-
tionship between the basis of the constitutional violation
-state law mandating racial segregation in the schools-and
the present structure of the school system, which had been
established in accordance with the requirements of state-im-
posed segregation.
In Swann, the Court was confronted with what may be
called a "remedy dilemma. '21 The school authorities con-
tended that they satisfied their obligation to convert from a
promptly to a system without a 'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools,"
that would be attended by children of both races. 391 U.S. at 442.
Is The same day that the Court decided Green, it also held "freedom of choice"
plans to be insufficient in two other cases. Monroe v. Board of Comm'rs, 391 U.S. 450
(1968); Raney v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 443 (1968). In the wake of these cases, the
lower courts invariably rejected "freedom of choice" plans. See, e.g., Hall v. St. He-
lena Parish School Bd., 417 F.2d 801 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 904 (1969);
United States v. Hinds County School Bd., 417 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1969).
19 See the discussion of this point in Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and
the Courts, 51 Tax. L. Rv. 411, 449-51 (1973).
20 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
21 For a discussion of the "remedy dilemma" in response to Graglia's criticism of
the Court for requiring a "racial mix" in the schools under the guise of remedying de
jure segregation, see Sedler, Book Review, supra note 4, at 651-53.
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dual school system to a unitary one by substituting racially
neutral geographic attendance zoning for race as the basis of
school assignment. 22 Given patterns of residential racial segre-
gation, even in the absence of state-imposed segregation, there
would have been a large number of racially identifiable
schools in the school system just as there were in urban school
systems located in states where segregation was not required
by state law.23 While this is true, however, it is equally true
that this school system would not have had the particular
structure that it had at the time of Brown and thereafter if it
had not been for state laws requiring racial segregation in the
schools. The structure of that school system necessarily devel-
oped in conformity with the requirements of state-imposed
segregation, and decisions as to school construction, site loca-
tion, school size, school closure, and the like had to be made
with reference to those requirements.24 The essential structure
of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system that had been es-
tablished pursuant to the requirements of state law mandat-
ing racial segregation prior to Brown, remained in 1971, not
only because the majority of existing schools were probably
pre-Brown schools,25 but because the school authorities did
not even purport to dismantle the dual school system prior to
the time that the desegregation suit was filed in 1965. There
was simply no way of knowing what the particular structure of
the school system would have been if there had been no state
laws requiring school segregation, but it is clear that it would
not have had the same structure that it reflected because of
those laws. The Supreme Court recognized this point in
Swann, when it observed that "all things are not equal in a
22 In effect, geographic attendance zoning was the only permissible method of
student assignment after the Court effectively invalidated "freedom of choice" plans
in Green.
23 See notes 49-50 infra and accompanying text for a consideration of the effect
of migration of blacks to urban areas in the north on patterns of racial segregation.
21 See the discussion of this point in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1971).
25 In most urban school systems, enrollment in the post-1954 period remained
relatively stable, since the extensive growth during this time was in the suburban
districts. In Louisville, Kentucky, for example, 56 of the 65 schools in operation as of
1972 were pre-Brown schools. Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d
925, 929-30 (6th Cir. 1973).
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system that has been deliberately constructed and maintained
to enforce racial segregation,"2 and stated that the burden
was on the school authorities to establish that the racial com-
position of the schools was not "the result of present or past
discriminatory action on their part. '27
The "remedy dilemma" facing the Court in Swann then
was how to remedy the condition of de jure segregation ex-
isting in the school system, where the proposed means of con-
version to a unitary school system would leave remaining a
large number of racially identifiable schools, which were
brought into being by the requirement of state-imposed segre-
gation, but where, even in the absence of state-imposed segre-
gation, there still would have been a substantial number of
racially identifiable schools in the system. The Court's options
would appear to have been as follows: (1) ignore the influence
of state-imposed segregation on the present structure of the
school system, and permit geographic attendance zoning as a
means of converting to a unitary school system, although this
would result in a large number of racially identifiable schools;
(2) try to "sort out" the schools that would not have been ra-
cially identifiable in the absence of state-imposed segregation
and require only the desegregation of those schools; or (3)
treat the school system as being de jure segregated and re-
quire its dismantling by a plan that would "achieve the great-
est possible degree of actual desegregation, taking into ac-
count the practicalities of the situation."2 The Court opted
for the third alternative. As it stated:
The objective is to dismantle the dual school system. "Ra-
cially neutral" assignment plans proposed by school authori-
ties to a district court may be inadequate; such plans may
fail to counteract the continuing effects of past school segre-
gation resulting from discriminatory location of school sites
or distortion of school size in order to maintain an artificial
racial separation. When school authorities present a district
court with a "loaded game board," affirmative action in the
26 402 U.S. at 28.
27 Id. at 26.
28 This is the precise test that was formulated in the companion case of Davis v.
Board of School Comm'rs, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971).
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form of remedial altering of attendance zones is proper to
achieve truly nondiscriminatory assignments. In short, an
assignment plan is not acceptable simply because it appears
to be neutral.29
While it has been contended that the Court based its decision
in Swann on the social desirability of racial integration,3 0 and
while the Court's view as to the social desirability of racial
integration may have "tipped the scales" in favor of the "inte-
gration alternative," Swann nonetheless must be analyzed
with reference to the "remedy dilemma" that confronted the
Court. As will be developed more fully subsequently, the ex-
tent of the obligation imposed by Swann was "predominantly
causal," in that the school system would be required to deseg-
regate the racially identifiable schools that came into being
while the school system was being operated in accordance
with the requirements of state law mandating racial segrega-
tion. These schools would not only include the schools that
were constructed prior to Brown, but also the schools that
were constructed prior to the time that the school authorities
officially abandoned racial assignment and made the "first ef-
fort" to convert to a unitary school system. For many school
systems in the south, like Charlotte-Mecklenburg, there was
no "first effort" prior to the time a desegregation suit was
filed, so that all of their schools would be deemed to be "ves-
tiges of state-imposed segregation," and the entire system
would have to be desegregated to the maximum extent
feasible. 31
Some school systems in the southern and border states
had made a "first effort" at desegregation by the use of geo-
graphic attendance zoning, which, in light of Swann, would be
insufficient to convert to a unitary system where a large num-
ber of racially identifiable schools remained. However, the ra-
tionale of Swann would only cover the pre-Brown and pre-
29 402 U.S. at 28.
"O See Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case - Its Significance for Northern
School Desegregation, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697, 704-07 (1971); L. GRAGLIA, DISASTER BY
DECREE at 122-26.
" See note 28 supra and accompanying text for a consideration of the Court's
options when faced with a dual school system.
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"first effort" racially identifiable schools in those systems and
would not cover those schools that were constructed as or be-
came racially identifiable schools thereafter. Louisville, Ken-
tucky, for example, undertook its "first effort" at desegrega-
tion in 1955. When a post-Swann suit was filed against it in
1972,32 it had sixty-five schools in operation. Fifty-six of these
schools were pre-Brown schools, of which thirty-five had never
changed in racial composition. Of the remaining twenty-one
pre-Brown schools, thirteen were pre-Brown white schools, lo-
cated in close proximity to pre-Brown black schools to serve
whites residing in the neighborhoods, which became racially
identifiable black schools as the black population expanded
into those areas. Of the nine schools constructed since 1955,
six opened as racially identifiable schools. Thus, while fifty-
four of the sixty-five schools were racially identifiable with re-
spect to student composition; only thirty-five were schools
that retained their pre-Brown racial identifiability.33 In the
adjoining Jefferson County district, which covered suburban
Louisville, and which had only four percent black students,
there had been one pre-Brown black elementary school; after
1955, another elementary school opened as a predominantly
black school, and a third school became predominantly black
because of changing residential patterns. 4
The rationale for requiring the desegregation of those
schools was found in two 1972 cases, Wright v. City Council of
Emporia,3 5 and United States v. Scotland Neck City Board
of Education,6 which concerned the formation of new school
districts in states where segregation had been required by
state law. The Court held that a new district could not be
carved out of an existing district that had not yet converted to
a unitary school system where the formation of the new dis-
trict "would actually impede the process of dismantling the
3' Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925 (6th Cir. 1973),
vacated and remanded, 418 U.S. 918, reinstated, 510 F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 931 (1975).
"3 489 F.2d at 930-31.
34 Id. at 928.
35 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
36 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
[Vol. 68
RIGHT TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
existing dual [school] system. '37 In so holding, the Court
made it clear that until the school system had become uni-
tary, the school authorities had the affirmative duty not to
take any action that "had the effect of increasing or perpetu-
ating segregation." 38 Until unitary status had been achieved,
the school authorities could not construct any school that
opened as a racially identifiable school or permit any other
school to become racially identifiable. Under the affirmative
duty rationale, all of the schools that became racially identifi-
able after the "first effort" were also vestiges of state-imposed
segregation, along with the pre-"first effort" schools. As the
Sixth Circuit stated in the Louisville-Jefferson County case:
Where a school district has not yet fully converted to a uni-
tary system, the validity of its actions must be judged ac-
cording to whether they hinder or further the process of
school desegregation .... Since the Jefferson County Board
has not eliminated all vestiges of state-imposed segregation
from the system, it had the affirmative responsibility to see
that no other school in addition to Newburg would become a
racially identifiable black school. It could not be 'neutral'
with respect to student assignments at Price or Cane Run. It
was required to insure that neither school would become ra-
cially identifiable.39
Where the school system had been operated pursuant to state
laws requiring racial segregation, therefore, all of the racially
identifiable schools in the system were deemed to be de jure
segregated, and the school system had to be desegregated to
the maximum extent feasible.'0
The Court's decision in Swann relating to the school au-
thorities' obligation to convert to a unitary school system nec-
essarily defined the nature of the substantive right recognized
in Brown. It was the right to attend school in a school system
from which all vestiges of de jure segregation had been elimi-
3" 407 U.S. at 466.
38 Id. at 462. See also Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 99 S. Ct. 2971, 2979-80
(1979).
39 489 F.2d at 929. The court did not explicitly discuss the application of this
principle in regard to the schools in the Louisville system.
40 Such desegregation would include, where necessary, extensive student trans-
portation. See Swann, 402 U.S. at 29-31.
1979-80]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
nated, which would not be considered to have occurred until
the school system had achieved the "greatest possible degree
of actual desegregation, taking into account the practicalities
of the situation."'41 While the nature of the substantive right is
thus framed with reference to the situation existing in the
school system, the extent of the obligation to convert to a uni-
tary school system insures that most of the children enrolled
in the system will in fact be attending racially integrated
schools. 42 As a result of Swann, there has been a great deal of
actual desegregation in the states in which racial segregation
was formerly required by state law, with the rather anomalous
consequence that in those states today a much higher propor-
tion of black children in fact are attending racially integrated
schools than in those states where segregation was not re-
quired by state law. 43
The extent of the obligation imposed on the state by
Swann is "predominantly causal" in the sense that the racial
identifiability of most of the schools in the system can be
traced structurally to the operation of the school system in
accordance with the requirements of state law mandating ra-
cial segregation. The operation of the school system in accor-
dance with those requirements was deemed to be the cause of
the racial identifiability of all the pre-Brown and pre-"first ef-
fort" schools. Although in the absence of state-imposed segre-
gation there would still have been a substantial number of ra-
cially identifiable schools because of residential racial
segregation, 4 4 the Court in Swann, as discussed earlier, re-
41 402 U.S. at 37.
42 In some circumstances, however, considerations of practicability may result in
the retention of some racially identifiable schools within the school system. See, e.g.,
Medley v. School Bd., 482 F.2d 1061 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1172
(1974); Goss v. Board of Educ. 482 F.2d 1044 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1171 (1974). Considerations of practicability are analyzed in terms of the duty to
dismantle the dual school system. More might be demanded if the substantive right
related to attendance at a racially integrated school. Moreover, to the extent that
interdistrict remedies are precluded, most black children enrolled in a predominantly
black school system such as Detroit or Atlanta will be unable to attend a racially
integrated school.
43 See U.S. COMM. ON CvqL RIGHTS, TWENTY YEARS AFTER BROWN 48-55 (1975).
" School segregation and residential segregation, however, are to some extent
mutually reinforcing. See the discussion of this point by the Court in Swann, 402
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fused to try to "sort out" the schools that would not have
been racially identifiable from those that would have been. It
took the position that state law requiring racial segregation
caused the school system to have the particular structure that
it had, and that the state was required to dismantle fully the
structure that came into being because of unconstitutional
governmental action to the maximum extent possible. The
"normative" extent of the obligation related only to those rel-
atively few schools that were constructed as or became racially
identifiable between the time of the "first effort," if any, and
the final desegregation order."' Therefore, it can be said that
the extent of the obligation imposed by Swann is "predomi-
nantly causal" rather than predominantly "normative," since
the state is required to eliminate the racial identifiability of
schools that was deemed to have been caused primarily by un-
constitutional governmental action.
Swann then made it clear that the substantive right of
school children enrolled in a school system located in a state
where segregation was required by state law is the right to
attend school in a school system in which there presently exist
no vestiges of de jure segregation, and the school system has
the corresponding obligation to eliminate racially identifiable
schools to the maximum extent feasible. For a great many
black children in these states, recognition of this right and
corresponding obligation has in practice meant attendance at
racially integrated schools.
B. Segregation Produced by School Board Action
The etiology of school segregation in school systems lo-
cated outside of the southern and border states, where segre-
gation was not required by state law, differs somewhat from
U.S. at 20-21. See generally Taeuber, Housing, Schools, and Incremental Segregative
Effects, 441 ANNALS, 157-67 (1979); Taeuber and Wilson, Residential and School Seg-
regation: Some Tests of Their Association, DEMOGRAPHY OF RACIAL AND ETHNIC
GROUPS (Bean & Frisbie, ed. 1978).
15 In such systems, however, the school authorities also may have taken actions
that contributed to the racial identifiability of these schools. See, e.g., Jefferson v.
Board of Educ. of Fayette County, 344 F. Supp. 688 (E.D. Ky. 1972), afj'd mem., 486
F.2d 1405 (6th Cir. 1973).
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that existing in the southern and border state systems, partic-
ularly in relation to residential racial patterns and to demo-
graphic change. Although there always had been extensive
residential racial segregation in the southern and border sys-
tems, school segregation existed independently and in a sense
was superimposed on residential patterns.46 Where school seg-
regation was not required by state law, however, the actual
segregation existing in the schools had to be directly related
to residential racial segregation, and this residential racial seg-
regation was the predicate for the existence of racially identi-
fiable schools. In challenges to school segregation existing in
these systems, the essential contention is that the school au-
thorities have built on patterns of residential segregation to
maximize school segregation and to bring about the existence
of racially identifiable schools instead of racially integrated
schools. 47 But since state law did not require school segre-
gation, if it were not for patterns of residential racial seg-
regation, there would have been nothing that the school
authorities could do, short of the most blatant racial gerry-
mandering,48 to bring about racially identifiable schools.
In addition, since World War II, there has been a very
substantial movement of black population fom the southern
and border states to urban areas outside of the south.49 This
movement would result in an initial increase in the black pop-
ulation of the urban school systems, and a further increase in
the black enrollment percentage of those systems, as some
whites "fled" to the suburban areas. Apart from any action by
school authorities to maximize actual segregation, the in-
creased black population in the system, interacting with resi-
dential racial transition, would change the racial composition
of some schools from predominantly white to predominantly
black, and the construction of new schools in the portions of
the system into which blacks were moving often would pro-
46 One method utilized for this purpose was dual attendance zones.
47 See generally Farley, Residential Segregation and Its Implications for School
Integration, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB., 164 (1975).
48 An example is Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 350 U.S. 1006 (1956).
41 See Hauser, Demographic Factors in the Integration of the Negro, 1 TH
NEGRO AMERICAN 847, 850-52 (1965).
[Vol. 68
RIGHT TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
duce racially identifiable schools. In the typical urban school
system outside of the south, therefore, many of the racially
identifiable black schools were constructed or became racially
identifiable post-Brown, and a number of the racially identifi-
able black schools once would have been predominantly white
or racially integrated schools.50 The different etiology of
school segregation in school systems located outside of the
south could affect the analysis of the nature of the substantive
right and the corresponding obligation of the state.
The evolution of the Court's doctrine regarding the con-
stitutionality of school segregation existing in school systems
located in states in which segregation was not required by
state law, however, can be seen in retrospect as track-
ing-although not always evenly-the evolution of the Court's
doctrine with respect to the constitutionality of segregation
existing in school systems located in states where segregation
was so required. It is clear in retrospect that the Court has
been trying to develop a doctrine that would assimilate the
two situations for constitutional purposes. The unifying ele-
ment in the assimilative process has been the concept of de
jure segregation. The Constitution has not been interpreted as
prohibiting the states from maintaining racially identifiable or
"factually segregated" schools, even where it would be feasible
to desegregate the schools by departing from strict geographic
attendance zoning.5 1 What the Constitution has been inter-
preted as prohibiting is intentional racial segregation in the
operation of the school system, resulting in the maintenance
of racially identifiable schools. In school systems located in
states in which segregation was not required by state law prior
o In Akron, Ohio, for example, all of the present racially identifiable black
schools, except for a small elementary school constructed in 1968, were at one time
predominantly white-in some cases all-white schools. There was another black ele-
mentary school, since closed, that was racially identifiable as of 1940, the first date
for which figures were available.
5, While the Supreme Court specifically left this question open in Keyes v.
School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 212 (1973), all of the federal circuits that have
passed on the question have so held. See, e.g., Deal v. Cincinnati Bd. of Educ., 366
F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967); Springfield School Comm.
v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965) (dicta); Downs v. KanSas City Bd. of Educ.,
336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965); Bell v. School City of
Gary, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964).
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to Brown, intentional segregative action of school authorities
has been equated for constitutional purposes with state laws
requiring segregation. Where such action has been shown, de
jure segregation exists in the school system. The school sys-
tem is deemed to be a dual school system in part, which, as
regards the obligation to dismantle the dual system, is
equated with the obligation to dismantle a system as a whole
that was produced by state laws requiring school segregation.
The concept of de jure segregation was developed prima-
rily in lower federal court cases involving challenges to the
maintenance of racially identifiable schools in systems where
segregation had not been required by state law. The plaintiffs
in those cases contended that since the harm caused to minor-
ity children from required attendance at racially segregated
schools, which the Supreme Court recognized in Brown, 2 was
the same regardless of how those schools came into being, the
state had the affirmative duty to operate desegregated
schools.53 The courts uniformly rejected this contention on the
ground that what the Supreme Court found unconstitutional
in Brown was compulsory school segregation, pursuant to
state law, rather than the operation of schools that were in
fact racially identifiable." What emerged from these cases was
:2 See notes 197-204 infra and accompanying text for a consideration of Brown.
3' It was this thesis that the author developed some years ago, focusing on the
"feelings of inferiority" aspect of Brown, in Sedler, School Segregation in the North
and West: Legal Aspects, 7 ST. Louis. U.L.J. 228, 250-71 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
School Segregation]. The thesis was developed very tentatively and was not related
sufficiently to constitutional values. Moreover, since the courts had not yet ordered
student transportation to overcome de jure segregation, my view of the "duty to inte-
grate" did not include student transportation. Id. at 268-69. While the earlier writing
is superseded by the present work, some of the analysis set forth in the present work
has its genesis in the earlier work.
" See note 51 supra for cases which reject this contention. This was a clearly
legitimate reading of Brown. As Professor Fiss has noted, in Brown the Court was
confronted with the phenomena of both racial assignment and a demographic pattern
by which all the white students were in some schools and all the black students were
in other schools, and the phenomena were causally related. It was not necessary,
therefore, for the Court to "determine whether the principal vice was the racial as-
signment or the segregated schools." Fiss, School Desegregation: The Uncertain Path
of the Law, 4 PHmi. & PuB. AFF. 3 (1974). Since state law required racial assignment
in Brown, the courts could explain Brown on that basis and take the position that the
harm caused by attendance at racially identifiable schools was irrelevant in the ab-
sence of state laws mandating compulsory assignment to those schools.
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the principle that school authorities could not require the seg-
regation of the schools, but that they had no duty to integrate
the schools. It may be noted that the "no duty to integrate"
notion had been accepted by some lower federal courts prior
to Green and Swann, in dealing with the obligation to dis-
mantle the dual school system, when they upheld ineffective
"freedom of choice" plans and geographic attendance zoning
that resulted in the continued maintenance of a large number
of racially identifiable schools.55 If there was no duty to inte-
grate in that situation, there clearly would be no basis for
finding such a duty in states where segregation had never
been required by state law.56
On the other hand, where it was obvious that the school
authorities were deliberately trying to maintain racial segrega-
tion in the system, such as where they had employed discon-
tiguous attendance zones to put all of the black children in a
single school,5 7 or had altered attendance zones to coincide
with black population movement and had permitted white
children to transfer from a predominantly black school, 8 the
courts had no difficulty in equating the intentionally segrega-
tive actions with state laws requiring racial segregation.5 9
5 This is the path which the Fourth Circuit followed when Green and Swann
were before it. See also Goss v. Board of Educ., 406 F.2d 1183 (6th Cir. 1969). The
"classic" statments of "no duty to integrate" are found in Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F.
Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955), overruled on this point, United States v. Jefferson
County Bd. of Educ., 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1967), and Thompson v. County School,
144 F. Supp. 239, 240 (E.D. Va.), af'd, 240 F.2d 59 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 910 (1957).
56 In Swann, the Court emphasized that the school authorities could assign stu-
dents to schools on the basis of race for purposes of integration, even in the absence
of de jure segregation, thereby in effect affirming a long line of state court decisions
upholding the constitutionality of integration programs voluntarily undertaken by
school authorities or required by state law. 402 U.S. at 16. See, e.g., Tometz v. Board
of Educ., 237 N.E.2d 498 (IlI. 1968); School Comm. v. Board of Educ., 227 N.E.2d 729
(Mass. 1967), appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 572 (1968); Pennsylvania Human Relations
Comm'n v. Chester School Dist., 233 A.2d 290 (Pa. 1967). See also Lee v. Nyquist,
318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y. 1970), af'd mem. 402 U.S. 935 (1971). See generally the
discussion of this point in Sedler, Book Review, supra note 4, at 647-48.
57 See Clemons v. Board of Educ., 228 F.2d 853 (6th Cir. 1956).
58 See Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961).
59 See the discussion of this point by the district court in Taylor v. Board of
Educ., 191 F. Supp. 181, 194 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 940 (1961).
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When it became clear that the lower federal courts would not
recognize an affirmative duty to integrate and that the Su-
preme Court was not disposed to consider the question at that
time,"0 the de jure segregation doctrine was accepted, so to
speak, and lawyers for the plaintiffs"' developed their cases
within the framework of the doctrine.
The doctrine required a showing that school authorities
were practicing a policy of segregation,62 building on existing
residential racial segregation to maximize school segregation
and the number of racially identifiable schools in the system.
A policy of segregation could be inferred from a pattern of
discretionary decisions made by school authorities with re-
spect to the redrawing of attendance zones, the setting up of
optional zones, school construction and closure, teacher as-
signment, and the like, which maximimized racial segregation
and contributed to the racial identifiability of schools in the
system." In the late 1960's and early 1970's, the courts were
concluding that segregative intent was present in case after
case on the grounds that (1) the discretionary decisions of the
school authorities showed a pattern of maximizing racial seg-
regation and causing schools to become racially identifiable,
and (2) these decisions could not be explained consistently in
terms of racially neutral criteria or the criteria that the school
authorities purportedly were applying.6 4 As the Sixth Circuit
put it in one case, the school board's decisions "more often
than not tended to perpetuate segregation," and any attempt
to justify those decisions in terms of purportedly neutral cri-
60 The Court's refusal to confront the question was evidenced by its denial of
certiorari in the cases in which the question was presented. See note 51 supra for
cases which reflect the refusal to recognize the duty to integrate.
61 Most of the cases in the north, as well as the south, were sponsored by the
NAACP, which furnished the lawyers and financed the litigation.
62 See the discussion of the policy of segregation concept in Sedler, School Segre-
gation, supra note 53, at 239-47.
63 As to proof of a policy of segregation, see Dimond, School Segregation in the
North: There Is But One Constitution, 7 HARv. C.R.-C.L.L. Rav. 1, 20, 32 (1972).
" See, e.g., United States v. Board of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973); Kelly v. Guinn, 456 F.2d 100 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 917 (1973); Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d 573 (6th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 404 U.S. 913 (1971); United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir.
1968).
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teria would usually require "inconsistent application of those
criteria. '6 5 So while it was necessary to show segregative in-
tent to render the resulting segregation de jure and thus un-
constitutional, the standard of segregative intent was the ob-
jective or "tort" standard,66 and in practice it usually was not
difficult to satisfy this standard. 7
What is important for present purposes is that segrega-
tive intent was assimilated to state laws requiring school seg-
regation, so that doctrinal continuity with Brown, reflected in
the doctrine of de jure segregation, was maintained.' While
there was still no constitutional right to attend a racially inte-
grated school, it was possible, by showing a policy of segrega-
tion on the part of the school authorities, to bring about
school desegregation in school systems located in states where
segregation had not been required by state law.
In terms of the extent of the school authorities' obligation
to remedy the constitutional violation, however, there is an
important "causation difference" between the situation in
which the existence of de jure segregation is premised on a
policy of segregation and in which it is premised on state laws
requiring racial segregation in the schools. As discussed ear-
lier,6 9 where school segregation was not required by state law,
the existing segregation was related more directly to residen-
tial racial segregation, in that the structure of the school sys-
tem did not require school segregation regardless of residen-
tial racial patterns. But precisely because residential patterns
were racially segregated, geographic attendance zoning, with-
out manipulation, could produce a substantial number of ra-
65 Davis v. School Dist., 443 F.2d at 576.
66 See, e.g., United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162, 168-70 (5th Cir.
1977); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37, 50-51 (2d Cir. 1975);
Morgan v. Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580, 588 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963
(1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178, 182-83 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1974).
67 But see Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974), in which the
court found an absence of "many of the more commonly used or classic segregative
techniques found in other cases," and held that a policy of segregation had not been
established. Id. at 787.
" See Fiss, supra note 54, at 36-38.
69 See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the impact of
residential racial segregation on the structure of the school system.
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cially identifiable schools in most systems. In practice, the in-
tentional segregative actions usually occurred in areas
experiencing residential racial transition or in areas where
blacks and whites lived in fairly close proximity. And because
of changing residential patterns, it could be argued that some
of the schools affected by the segregative acts at an earlier
time would have become racially identifiable at a later time
regardless of those acts.7 0
Since state law did not require systemwide segregation
and since school segregation was more directly related to resi-
dential segregation, the "sorting out" problem and the "rem-
edy dilemma" that confronted the Court in Swann would not
be present when de jure segregation was premised on a policy
of segregation. It would be possible to identify those areas of
the school system where no segregative acts occurred, and at
least to some extent, those schools that could not have been
affected by the segregative acts occurring elsewhere, namely
those schools located in areas of extreme racial concentration.
There could also be a question as to how much the segregative
acts contributed to the racial identifiability of a particular
school at a given time, and whether the school would have be-
come racially identifiable at a later time anyway because of
changing residential patterns. Therefore, the Court's resolu-
tion of the causation question in Swann and its rationale for
ordering systemwide desegregation to the maximum extent
feasible to remedy the de jure segregation premised on state
laws requiring segregation is logically inapplicable to the situ-
ation in which de jure segregation is premised on a policy of
segregation. In the latter situation there is necessarily a ques-
tion as to how much of the actual segregation in the system is
traceable to the constitutional violation and as to how much
of it the state is required to remedy. More concretely, the
question is whether the requirement is to desegregate all of
the racially identifiable schools in the system to the maximum
extent feasible, and if not, which of the racially identifiable
7 This refers to the racially identifiable black schools, where changing residen-
tial patterns made the areas served by schools predominantly black. While blacks
move into formerly white residential areas as a part of the process of "expanding
ghettoization," whites generally do not move into black residential areas.
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schools must be desegregated.
This was the issue that confronted the Supreme Court in
Keyes v. School District Number 1,71 decided in 1973, which
was the first case presenting the Court with segregation in a
school system located in a state where segregation was not re-
quired by state law. Like similar cases involving challenges to
segregation existing in such school systems, the plaintiffs in
Keyes, "apparently concede[d] for the purposes of this case
that in the case of a school system like Denver's where no
statutory dual school system has ever existed, plaintiffs must
prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it
was brought about or maintained by intentional state ac-
tion. 7 2 In Denver, the black and Hispanic population" his-
torically was concentrated in the "core city," which was lo-
cated in the north-central part of the school district. In the
1950's, the black population expanded eastward, and close to
forty percent of the black school population resided in the
northeast portion of the school district known as Park Hill. At
the time of the trial, there were twenty-five racially identifi-
able minority "core city" schools and five racially identifiable
black schools in the Park Hill area. The plaintiffs introduced
evidence of intentionally segregative acts in the Park Hill area
and as to five of the "core city" schools. The district court
found that the acts affecting the "core city" schools were not
undertaken with segregative intent, but that segregative in-
tent had been proved with respect to the Park Hill area.7 4
However, it ordered the desegregation of the "core city"
schools as well on the ground that they were "educationally
inferior" to the predominantly Anglo schools.7 5 That portion
of its judgment was reversed by the Tenth Circuit on the
ground that desegration could not be ordered unless the segre-
gated condition of the schools was shown to have been pro-
7- 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
72 413 U.S. at 198.
7 The Court held that the combined black and Hispanic enrollment of a school
was to be considered for the purpose of determining whether the school was "segre-
gated." 413 U.S. at 197-98.
74 Id. at 192-93.
75 Id. at 193-94.
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duced by intentionally segregative acts.76 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to review the Tenth Circuit's judgment as it
pertained to the "core city" schools.77
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the segrega-
tion existing with respect to the "core city" schools could be
found to be de jure and subject to redress. Once segregative
intent had been proved in regard to a "substantial portion of
the school system," there was a presumption of the existence
of a dual school system, which shifted the burden to the
school authorities to demonstrate that the segregated charac-
ter of the rest of the system was not also the result of their
intentionally segregative actions.7 8 There was a twofold justifi-
cation for this presumption. First, since the different parts of
a school system generally are not administered separately, the
segregative acts in one portion of the system could have an
effect on schools located in other portions of the system. 0
Second, if segregative intent was present in the operation of
part of the system, it would likely be present in the operation
of the remainder. 0 The case was remanded for further pro-
ceedings in regard to the school authorities' responsibility for
the segregated character of the "core city" schools. On re-
mand, the district court found that the Park Hill area was not
administered separately from the rest of the school system,
and held that the school authorities had not succeeded in
proving that its actions with respect to the Park Hill area had
no effect on the racial composition of the "core city" schools. 1
Since this was so, it did not matter whether their actions with
respect to the "core city" schools were undertaken with segre-
gative intent. The court's decree ordering systemwide desegre-
gation was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit, and the Supreme
Court denied review.82
76 Id. at 194-95.
" Id. at 195. The Court denied the school board's petition for certiorari to review
the findings with respect to the Park Hill schools.
71 Id. at 208-09.
79 Id. at 201-05.
:o Id. at 207-09.
' Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 368 F. Supp. 207, 210 (D. Colo. 1973). For subse-
quent history see note 82 infra and accompanying text.
82 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1066 (1976).
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According to one critic of Keyes, the school authorities
were "subject to a kind of shell game and found to have
lost."8 3 This criticism is valid if the underlying premise is that
the state is only required to remedy that portion of the actual
segregation that is traceable, from a causation standpoint, to
the proven policy of segregation.8 4 The Supreme Court as-
sumed that the school authorities' segregative actions with re-
spect to the Park Hill schools caused those schools to become
racially identifiable. It did not require the plaintiffs to show
the extent to which those actions contributed to the racial
identifiability of those schools or that those schools would not
have become racially identifiable if those actions had not oc-
curred. However, those actions were at least a contributing
cause to the racial identifiability of those schools at a given
point in time,85 and if the schools would have become racially
identifiable even in the absence of those actions, the burden
should be on the school authorities so to demonstrate.8
The major thrust of the "causation criticism" of Keyes,
however, revolves around the absence of a link between the
school authorities' actions in the Park Hill area and the racial
identifiability of the "core city" schools. This criticism seems
valid since regardless of who had the burden of proof on this
issue, there simply was no significant link. It was undisputed
that the "core city" schools had become racially identifiable
before blacks had begun to move into the Park Hill area.8 7
Consequently, it is very difficult to see how the school authori-
ties' actions in the Park Hill area could affect the racial iden-
tifiability of the "core city" schools at all. Even assuming the
maximum reciprocal effect of the school authorities' actions
on residential patterns, the most that their actions in the Park
83 L. GRAGLIA, supra note 30, at 161.
84 This is Professor Graglia's position. L. GRAGLIA, supra note 30, at 73-74.
And, therefore, it can be argued that the duty to desegregate the school
becomes fixed at that point in time and is unaffected by population shifts that may
have changed the racial composition of the school. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 489 F.2d 925, 931 (6th Cir. 1973).
88 This is so particularly in light of the reciprocal effect that school assignment
can have on residential patterns. See note 44 supra and authorities cited therein con-
cerning residential segregation.
8" See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279, 282-83 (D. Colo. 1969).
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Hill area could have done was to cause whites to move into
that part of the Park Hill area served by the predominantly
white schools and to avoid that part of the Park Hill area
served by the racially identifiable black schools. Whites were
not living in the "core city" area, and would not have moved
there regardless of what the school authorities did in Park
Hill. And even if the school authorities' actions discouraged
blacks from moving into Park Hill from the "core city," this
result would not affect the racial identifiability of the "core
city" schools, which were such because the population of the
"core city" area was overwhelmingly black and Hispanic.83
From a causation standpoint, the question should not
have been, as the district court assumed on remand, whether
the different parts of the school system were separately ad-
ministered, but whether there was any relationship between
the school authorities' actions in the Park Hill area and the
racial identifiability of the "core city" schools. Here there was
not, since the "core city" schools became racially identifiable
before the school authorities did anything in the Park Hill
area. Perhaps the district court erroneously restricted the
scope of the inquiry on remand, 9 but given the district court's
original finding as to the absence of segregative intent with
respect to the "core city" schools, and the clear absence of a
link between the school authorities' actions in the Park Hill
area and the racial identifiability of the "core city" schools,
the state here was required to remedy segregation that was
not traceable to the constitutional violation.
The actual result, however, is not unfair, since the district
court probably erred in finding that the school authorities did
not undertake segregative acts with respect to the "core city"
schools. At the trial the plaintiffs introduced evidence of seg-
regative acts as to five of the twenty-five racially identifiable
"core city" schools, occurring between 1951 and 1962. The dis-
trict court's finding that these acts were not undertaken with
aSId.
" The Tenth Circuit held that the district court's findings were not "clearly er-
roneous," and that insofar as the district court may have failed to interpret the Su-
preme Court's remand order properly, its findings "support a ruling favorable to the
plaintiffs under a correct reading of the High Court's opinion." 521 F.2d at 472-73.
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segregative intent" seems highly questionable under the ob-
jective standard of segregative intent that is generally fol-
lowed by the courts.9 1 If the district court had made a finding
of segregative intent, it would have been reasonable to assume
that those actions affected the other "core city" schools as
well, unless the school authorities could show otherwise.92
But the basis for the imposition of a systemwide desegre-
gation remedy in Keyes did not depend on a finding of inten-
tionally segregative actions with respect to the "core city"
schools. The effect of Keyes was to hold that where a school
system located in a state in which segregation was not re-
quired by state law has been found to have practiced a policy
of segregation with respect to a "substantial portion" of the
school system, it is in the same position as a school system
located in a state in which segregation was required by state
law with respect to the obligation to desegregate. Since it was
presumed that the segregative actions in that portion of the
school system affected the racial composition of the schools in
other portions of the school system, with the school authori-
ties having the virtually impossible burden in practice of re-
butting that presumption,93 they would be required to deseg-
regate all of the racially identifiable schools in the system to
the maximum extent feasible. The lower courts were so inter-
preting Keyes, and once they found a policy of segregation,
they were ordering systemwide desegregation.9 4
Keyes therefore turns out to have tracked Swann, both
doctrinally and pragmatically. For purposes of the constitu-
90 303 F. Supp. at 73-76.
' See note 66 supra and cases cited therein for an application of the standard.
The district court appeared to be using a subjective standard, confusing "motivation"
with "intent."
" In such a case, the Keyes presumption would come into play.
,3 This is illustrated by the result in Keyes on remand. See the discussion of this
point in Fiss, supra note 54, at 22-25.
See, e.g., Brennan v. Armstrong, 539 F.2d 625 (7th Cir. 1976), vacated and
remanded, 433 U.S. 672 (1977); United States v. Texas Edue. Agency, 532 F.2d 380
(5th Cir.), vacated sub nom. Austin Independent School Dist. v. United States, 429
U.S. 990 (1976), reinstated, 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3106
(1979); United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir. 1975), vacated and re-
manded, 433 U.S. 667, reinstated, 565 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1064 (1978).
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tional violation, segregative intent was assimilated to state
laws requiring school segregation under the concept of de jure
segregation. As regards the scope of the obligation to redress
the constitutional violation, the doctrine propounded in Keyes
had the same practical effect as the doctrine propouned in
Swann. In Swann, the school system as a whole was deemed
to be de jure segregated because of the state law requiring
racial segregation, while in Keyes the school system as a whole
was presumed to be de jure segregated because of the policy
of segregation affecting a "substantial portion" of the school
system. But since the Keyes presumption appeared to be very
difficult to rebut in practice, the practical effect was the same
in both situations, and all of the racially identifiable schools
had to be desegregated to the maximum extent feasible.
Again, the substantive right would be the right to attend
school in a school system in which there presently exists no
vestiges of de jure segregation, and in most instances imple-
mentation of this right would result in attendance at desegre-
gated schools."5
In Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman (Dayton I),"
however, decided in 1977, the Court indicated that the obliga-
tion to desegregate might differ where the constitutional vio-
lation was premised on a policy of segregation rather than on
state law requiring school segregation, and that in this circum-
stance, the plaintiffs might be required to show a stronger
connection between the policy of segregation and the racial
identifiability of the schools in the system. Dayton I arose in a
somewhat unusual posture. The district court found that the
school authorities had engaged in some segregative acts affect-
ing a few schools, and it imposed a limited desegregation rem-
edy. On appeal the plaintiffs contended that the district court
erred in not finding that a number of other actions had been
undertaken with segregative intent. The Sixth Circuit, with-
95 As a practical matter, this would likely be so for all of the black students in
the school system, since the focus would be on eliminating the racially identifiable
black schools. It might not necessarily be so for all of the white students, depending
on the racial composition of the school system. As a practical matter most white par-
ents are not likely to object if the school that their children are attending is not
integrated.
433 U.S. 406 (1977).
[Vol. 68
RIGHT TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
out considering this contention, indicated that systemwide re-
lief was required, and the district court finally ordered a sys-
temwide desegregation plan, which the Sixth Circuit
approved.9 7 The Supreme Court held that systemwide relief
was inappropriate in light of the only violations found in the
record, and that there was no showing that systemwide relief
"was necessary to eliminate all vestiges of the state-imposed
school segregation."98 According to the Court, in a school sys-
tem such as Dayton, located in a state in which school segre-
gation was not required by state law, it was necessary first to
identify those actions of the school authorities that were un-
dertaken with segregative intent, and then to "determine how
much incremental segregative effect those violations had on
the racial distribution of the Dayton school population as
presently constituted, when that distribution is compared to
what it would have been in the absence of such constitutional
violations." 99 The desegregation remedy "must be designed to
redress that difference and only if there has been a sys-
temwide impact may there be a systemwide remedy." 100
Dayton I appeared to be a retreat from Keyes in regard
to the school authorities' obligation to desegregate where de
jure segregation was premised on a policy of segregation.101
The Court was somewhat vague, however, in regard to the
meaning of "incremental segregative effect." School board
lawyers were likely to argue that it meant that the Court had
to determine how much effect each segregative action had on
the racial composition of the schools directly affected by thai
action, both at the time that it occurred and at the present
time. In that connection they were likely to contend that if, as
a result of changing residential patterns, the school would be
racially identifiable at the present time, regardless of the past
segregative actions, the state was not required to desegregate
that school.10 2 What Justice Rehnquist, the writer of the
17 Id. at 408-09.
I Id. at 417.
99 Id. at 420.
100 Id.
101 Justice Brennan, in a concurring opinion, insisted that there was no retreat
from Keyes. Id. at 421-22.
102 This argument was raised by counsel for the school board in the Akron case.
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Court's opinion in Dayton I, was saying was that at a mini-
mum, it was necessary to show how the segregative actions
contributed to the racial identifiability of each school in the
system, and that the desegregation of a particular school
could be ordered only if those actions substantially contrib-
uted to the racial identifiability of that school. He clearly
meant to exclude from the desegregation remedy those ra-
cially identifiable schools located in areas of racial concentra-
tion, where geographic attendance zoning, without manipula-
tion, was the primary cause of racial identifiability.
10 3
If the Supreme Court was trying to send a "behavioral
message" to the lower federal courts in Dayton 1,104 telling
them to "back off" from ordering systemwide desegregation,
the courts did not "get the message," and generally adhered
to their prior decisions, taking care to bring them within the
scope of the "incremental segregative effect" test.105 This is
what the Sixth Circuit did when the Dayton case was re-
manded to it, and in another case involving the Columbus,
Ohio school sytem.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in both cases. The stage was thus set for the 1979 Columbus-
Dayton decisions and the final step in the evolution of the
Court's current doctrine.107
In Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick °s and Dayton Bd. of
That case is presently before the Sixth Circuit on appeal following a judgment in
favor of the school board by the district court, which held that the plaintiffs had
failed to establish that the racially identifiable character of the schools was caused by
intentionally segregative acts.
23 See Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 99 S. Ct. 2941, 2952, 2954-62 (1979)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
104 As to the "behavioral messages" of Supreme Court decisions, see the discus-
sion in Sedler, Metropolitan Desegregation, supra note 7, at 573-76.
105 See United States v. School Dist., 565 F.2d 127 (8th Cir. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1064 (1978); United States v. Texas Educ. Agency, 564 F.2d 162 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 3106 (1979).
10- Brinkman v. Gilligan, 583 F.2d 243 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd, 99 S. Ct. 2971
(1979); Penick v. Columbus Bd. of Educ., 583 F.2d 787 (6th Cir. 1978), aff'd 99 S. Ct.
2941 (1979).
107 For a comprehensive analysis of the Court's decisions from Keyes through
Dayton I, see Yudoff, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration,
and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 L. & CoNTrMP. PROB. 57, 91-
102 (1978).
108 99 S. Ct. 2941 (1979).
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Educ. v. Brinkman'0° the Court assimilated even more fully
than in Keyes a "policy of segregation" to the situation where
state laws required segregation. The assimilation was effected
by holding that the existence of a policy of segregation, like
state laws requiring school segregation at the time of Brown,
gave rise to a dual school system for constitutional purposes.
In both Columbus and Dayton the Court looked to the exis-
tence of de jure segregation in the school system as of 1954,
when Brown was decided.11 In Dayton, the lower courts
found that at that time the school system was maintaining
four black schools that had become racially identifiable as a
result of intentionally segregative action."' In Columbus, the
finding was that at that time the school authorities intention-
ally had maintained "an enclave of separate, black schools on
the near east side of Columbus."'" 2 The Court held that the
existence of de jure segregation in a part of the school system
as of 1954 made the school system a dual school system, or as
I would classify it, a dual school system in part. Where a dual
school system exists, there is not only a continuing and affirm-
ative duty to dismantle the dual school system, but until sat-
isfaction of that duty, there is also the affirmative duty "not
to take any action that would impede the process of disestab-
lishing the dual school system and its effect."' 3 This principle
had been recognized earlier in the context of the obligation to
desegregate school systems located in states where segregation
was required by state law,11 ' but as pointed out previously, it
was of limited importance in that situation, since most of the
racially identifiable schools in the school system were pre-
Brown schools or were constructed as racially identifiable
-09 99 S. Ct. 2971 (1979). The cases were heard in tandem and the opinions like-
wise should be read in tandem.
110 This was in response to the approach of the NAACP as counsel for the plain-
tiffs in both cases. The approach was to focus on the segregation existing as of 1954
and to argue that such segregation rendered the school system a dual one for consti-
tutional purposes.
"1 99 S. Ct. at 2977-78.
112 Id. at 2946.
"I Id. at 2979.
14 See the discussion at notes 35-40 supra and accompanying text, and the
Court's discussion in Dayton, 99 S. Ct. at 2979-80 for further explanation and citation
to relevant cases.
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schools before the "first effort," if any, at desegregation was
undertaken.115 It was of great significance, however, in regard
to segregation existing in urban school systems outside of the
south, such as Columbus and Dayton, where most of the ra-
cially identifiable black schools were constructed as or became
so after 1954, and a number of these schools were once
predominantly white schools.116 The Court discussed the evi-
dence regarding post-1954 segregative acts which was intro-
duced by the plaintiffs in both cases, but, as Justice Rehn-
quist charged in his dissent, given the affirmative duty
requirement of Columbus-Dayton, this discussion was "gratu-
itous anyway. '
Once a dual school system is shown to exist, in whole or
in part, then the affirmative duty takes over, and until the
dual school system has been dismantled, it is unnecessary to
demonstrate segregative intent with respect to the schools
that have subsequently become racially identifiable. As the
Court stated in Dayton:
But the measure of the post-Brown conduct of a school
board under an unsatisfied duty to liquidate a dual system is
effectiveness, not the purpose, of the actions in decreasing or
increasing the segregation caused by the dual system. As we
clearly established in Keyes and Swann, the Board had to
do more than abandon its prior discriminatory purpose. The
Board has had an affirmative responsibility to see that pupil
assignment policies and school construction and abandon-
ment practices "are not used and do not serve to perpetuate
or re-establish the dual school system," and the Board has a
"heavy burden" of showing that actions that increased or
continued the effects of the dual system serve important and
"' See the discussion in notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text for prior ref-
erence and supporting materials.
116 In Dayton, when the suit was filed in 1971, 21 schools had become racially
identifiable black schools, 99 S. Ct. at 2975 n.1, and in Columbus, as of 1975-76, ac-
cording to the district court, there were 49 racially identifiable black schools. 583 F.2d
at 800. It may be noted in this regard, however, that the district court's definition of
"racially identifiable" was based on a plus or minus statistical variation of the black
enrollment in the system and thus in part was related to "racial balance." Id. at 799.
However, there were 32 schools that were 80% black, 22 schools that were 90% black,
and 14 schools that were 96% black. Id. at 800.
,17 99 S. Ct. at 2982.
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legitimate ends.1 8
Since the board could not satisfy that "heavy burden" in ei-
ther case, all of the actual segregation-the existence of ra-
cially identifiable schools-that occurred after 1954 had to be
remedied as well.
Although the Court continued to refer to the Keyes pre-
sumption of systemwide intent and systemwide effect,11' the
continuing and affirmative duty principle, reaffirmed in Co-
lumbus-Dayton and applied to the schools that became ra-
cially identifiable after 1954, renders irrelevant any question
of systemwide intent and "incremental segregative effect."
Where intentionally segregative actions have created a dual
school system in part, the continuing and affirmative duty
principle operates with the same strength as where state law
has created a dual school system as a whole. The obligation of
the school authorities to dismantle the dual school system is
the same in both circumstances; 120 until the dual school sys-
tem has been dismantled fully, the school authorities are re-
sponsible for the subsequent racial identifiability of any
school in the system.
Dayton I was distinguished as a case in which, on the
basis of findings actually made, "[tjhere were only isolated in-
stances of intentional segregation, which were insufficient to
give rise to an inference of systemwide institutional purpose
and which did not add up to a facially substantial systemwide
impact.' 1 21 In other words, on the basis of the findings in
Dayton I, there was no predicate for finding the existence of a
dual school system in part. But since it was shown that the
Dayton school authorities were operating four racially segre-
gated black schools at the time of Brown I, there was a dual
school system in part at that time, and, coupled with the fail-
ure of the school authorities to fulfill their affirmative duty to
prevent further segregation,122 systemwide relief was neces-
"1 99 S. Ct. at 2979-80 (citations omitted).
119 Id. at 2978-79.
120 Id. at 2946 n.5.
121 Id. at 2950-51.
122 Id. at 2980. The Court listed a number of breaches of this affirmative duty,
most particularly the pattern of school construction, in which 22 of the 24 schools
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sary to dismantle fully the dual school system. And while the
statement in Dayton I regarding the necessity for determining
the "incremental segregative effect" of the school authorities'
constitutional violations is literally true, the constitutional vi-
olations for these purposes include not only the actions in es-
tablishing the dual school system in part, but the breach of
the affirmative duty to prevent further segregation. Stated
simply, once a dual school system in part was shown to exist
in 1954, the school authorities were required to remedy all of
the actual segregation existing at the present time and to
eliminate all of the racially identifiable schools in the system
to the maximum extent feasible.123
Justice White wrote for the Court in both cases, and his
opinion was joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens. The dissenting justices, while emphasizing dif-
ferent points to some extent,124 all disagreed with the affirma-
tive duty rationale of the majority opinion and argued that it
was necessary to show a causal link between segregative ac-
tions and the racial identifiability of particular schools. Jus-
tice Stewart saw Dayton I as making it clear that "unless a
school was affected by the violations, it should not be in-
cluded in the remedy.' ' 120 Justice Rehnquist would require a
"causal relationship between acts motivated by such a [dis-
criminatory] purpose and a current condition of segregation in
the school system. ' 126 As he stated in a strong dissent:
The Court suggests a radical new approach to desegregation
cases in systems without a history of statutorily mandated
separation of the races: if a district court concludes
-employing what in honesty must be characterized as an
that were constructed between 1950 and 1971 opened as racially identifiable schools.
,23 This was accomplished in the desegregation plans that were ordered by the
lower courts in both cases.
M" The Chief Justice and Justice Stewart concurred in Columbus and dissented
in Dayton on the ground that the findings of the district court in both cases--a find-
ing of systemwide de jure segregation in Columbus and of the absence of systemwide
de jure segregation in Dayton-should be upheld. 99 S. Ct. at 2983-88. Justices Pow-
ell and Rehnquist dissented in both cases.
125 Id. at 2987. As stated previously, this is the author's interpretation of what
Justice Rehnquist was saying in Dayton I. See note 103 supra and accompanying text
for an interpretation of Rehnquist's view.
128 99 S. Ct. at 2953.
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irrebuttable presumption-that if there was a "dual" school
system at the time of Brown I, it must find post-1954 consti-
tutional violations in a school board's failure to take every
affirmative step to integrate the system. Put differently, ra-
cial imbalance at the time the complaint is filed is sufficient
to support a systemwide, racial balance school busing rem-
edy if the district court can find some evidence of discrimi-
natory purpose prior to 1954, without any inquiry into the
causal relationship between those pre-1954 violations and
current segregation in the school system.127
Justice Rehnquist continued by distinguishing Swann from
Keyes, or more precisely, by distinguishing between the scope
of the state's obligation where the predicate for de jure segre-
gation is state law requiring segregated schools and where the
predicate is the school authorities' own policy of segrega-
tion.1 28 In the latter situation, said Justice Rehnquist, the
plaintiffs should have to show a "causal nexus between inten-
tional segregative actions and the conditions they seek to
remedy."'129
Implicit in Justice Rehnquist's argument is that the
Court employed a causal analysis in Swann to determine the
extent of the state's obligation to desegregate the school sys-
tem. As has been discussed previously, given the "remedy di-
lemma" confronting the Court in Swann, the extent of the ob-
ligation imposed there can be viewed as being "predominantly
causal."1 30 This "remedy dilemma" does not confront the
Court when dealing with de jure segregation predicated on a
policy of segregation, and in that situation it is possible to
identify at least to some degree the extent of the actual segre-
gation that is traceable to that policy." 1
The Court, however, consistently has tried to develop a
doctrine that would assimilate for constitutional purposes the
segregation existing in school systems located in states where
127 Id. at 2954.
128 Id. at 2955-58.
129 Id. at 2958.
130 See notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text for prior discussion and cita-
tion to the relevant language in Swann and background materials.
11 See notes 46-50 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the absence
of the "remedial dilemma" in de jure segregation cases.
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segregation was required by state law at the time of Brown to
that existing in states where it was not so required. Concern-
ing the existence of a constitutional violation, the Court ac-
complished the assimilation by equating intentionally segrega-
tive action on the part of school authorities with state laws
requiring racial segregation in the schools, which is reflected
in the doctrine of de jure segregation. 132 In Columbus-Dayton,
it achieved the same assimilation with respect to the obliga-
tion to remedy de jure segregation. In Swann, the obligation
was held to be the elimination of racially identifiable schools
throughout the system to the maximum extent feasible.133 In
Keyes, the Court tried to extend the obligation to school sys-
tems where the predicate for de jure segregation was a policy
of segregation rather than state law requiring segregation. It
did so by invoking a presumption of systemwide intent and
systemwide effect on the basis of a showing of de jure segrega-
tion with respect to a "substantial portion" of the school sys-
tem, which in practice was very difficult to rebut. 13 Dayton I,
however, cast some doubt on whether the Court really meant
to do what it appeared to be attempting in Keyes, and indi-
cated the need for a more direct showing of cause and effect
in school systems where segregation was not required by state
law. If the Court's intention in Dayton I was to take a
"predominantly causal" approach to the extent of the state's
obligation to remedy de jure segregation, that approach, as
stated previously, would be consistent with the approach
taken in Swann. But it also would mean that in practice the
state's obligation to achieve actual desegregation and to elimi-
nate racially identifiable schools would be substantially less in
school systems where the predicate for de jure segregation
was a policy of segregation than it would be in school systems
where the predicate was state law requiring school
segregation.
13 The Court left open, however, the broader question of whether the Constitu-
tion imposes an affirmative duty on the state to operate racially integrated schools.
" See note 28 supra and accompanying text for a consideration of this
obligation.
13, See notes 93-94 supra and accompanying text for lower court cases in which
systemwide desegregation was ordered.
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It was this result which the Court strongly abjured in Co-
lumbus-Dayton. As it stated:
Our decision in Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, plainly demon-
strates in the educational context that there is no magical
difference between segregated schools mandated by statute
and those that result from local segregative acts and poli-
cies .... [W]e fail to see why there should be a lesser con-
stitutional duty to eliminate that system than there would
have been had the system been ordained by law.135
The Court succeeded in imposing the same duty in both situa-
tions by (1) treating for constitutional purposes a dual school
system in part the same as a dual school system as a whole,
(2) and by invoking the normative part of the obligation to
desegregate that had been recognized in Wright and Scotland
Neck as applied to school systems located in states where seg-
regation had been required by state law to school systems
where the predicate for de jure segregation was a policy of
segregation.
In Keyes, the Court relied on the finding of de jure segre-
gation in a "substantial portion" of the school system to es-
tablish a presumption of systemwide intent and systemwide
effect. In Columbus-Dayton, it put aside that presumption
and held that, for constitutional purposes, a finding of de jure
segregation in a "substantial portion" of the school system
gave rise to the existence of a dual school system in part. The
obligation of the state to dismantle a dual system in part was
the same as the obligation to dismantle a dual school system
as a whole, and included the affirmative duty to avoid increas-
ing or perpetuating segregation until the dual school system
had been fully dismantled. While the affirmative duty princi-
ple was of limited importance in dealing with school systems
where segregation was required by state law, since the racial
identifiability of most of the schools in the system would have
been established before the "first effort," if any, toward deseg-
regation was undertaken, the principle had been recognized.
Therefore its invocation in the policy-of-segregation situation,
while of much more practical importance, did manage to
,35 99 S. Ct. at 2946 n.5 (emphasis added).
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maintain doctrinal consistency with the past.
Thus, Columbus-Dayton returns the Court to where it
appeared to want to be at the time of Keyes with respect to
the obligation to eliminate de jure segregation in school sys-
tems located in states where segregation was not required by
state law, but with a much firmer doctrinal foundation for
that position.136 The Court's present doctrine with respect to
the obligation on the part of such school systems to remedy de
jure segregation may be summarized as follows. Where school
authorities have, by intentionally segregative acts, created ra-
cially identifiable schools at the time of Brown,13 or I would
submit, at any time thereafter, 13 8 there is a dual school system
in part for constitutional purposes. The school authorities
have the affirmative obligation to dismantle the dual school
system, and until that obligation has been carried out, they
also have the affirmative obligation to prevent any other
school in the school system from becoming racially identifi-
able. These conditions being present, all of the racially identi-
fiable schools in the school system, both those existing at the
time the dual school system was first established and those
developing thereafter, are, for constitutional purposes, ves-
tiges of de jure segregation. The present obligation of the
school authorities, viewed in light of their failure to perform
138 Dayton I must be seen as an aberration of the Court's institutional behavior
in this regard.
17 It is not clear how much of a "dual school system" must exist in order for the
affirmative duty to be invoked. The Sixth Circuit has indicated that a single racially
identifiable black school may be sufficient. See notes 34-39 supra and accompanying
text for further explanation and citation to relevant Supreme Court decisions.
138 As Justice Stewart observed, a school system that was violating the Constitu-
tion in 1964 or 1979 has the same duty to remedy that violation as one that was
violating the Constitution in 1954. 99 S. Ct. at 2984. In the unlikely event, for exam-
ple, that a state enacted a law requiring school segregation after Brown, school sys-
tems complying with that law would be under the same duty to dismantle the dual
school system as they would be if the law had been enacted prior to 1954. Cf. Hall v.
St. Helena Parish School Bd., 197 F. Supp. 649 (E.D. La. 1961), aff'd mem., 368 U.S.
515 (1962). So too, where intentionally segregative actions on the part of school au-
thorities have resulted in the establishment of a dual school system for constitutional
purposes after 1954, there should be the same affirmative duty to dismantle the dual
school system as there would be if the dual school system had been established prior
to 1954. In Reed v. Rhodes, 607 F.2d 714, 716-17 (6th Cir. 1979), the Sixth Circuit
specifically held that the affirmative duty to desegregate applied when the system was
found to be dual as of 1964.
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their obligation in the past, including their permitting other
racially identifiable schools to come into existence, is to deseg-
regate the entire school system by eliminating racially identi-
fiable schools to the maximum extent feasible. Columbus-
Dayton then turns out to track Swann fully with respect to
the extent of the obligation to eliminate de jure segregation.
As is clear from the foregoing discussion, however, the ex-
tent of the obligation imposed by Columbus-Dayton, unlike
the extent of the obligation imposed by Swann, is "predomi-
nantly normative" rather than "predominantly causal." In Co-
lumbus and in Dayton the finding of de jure segregation was
predicated on school board action causing a few schools to be-
come racially identifiable black schools at a time when the
black population was concentrated in one part of the school
system. Most of the schools that were racially identifiable at
the present time became so after the dual school system in
part was first established, and the school authorities' obliga-
tion to desegregate those schools is based on the fact that they
had the affirmative duty to prevent those schools from becom-
ing racially identifiable, not that they caused them to become
racially identifiable by intentional segregative actions. As Jus-
tice Rehnquist noted in Columbus: "Here violations with re-
spect to five schools, only three of which exist today, occurring
over 30 years ago are the key premise for a systemwide racial
balance remedy involving 172 schools-most of which did not
exist in 1950.' '139 Be that as it may, Columbus-Dayton accom-
plishes in the segregation policy situation what Swann accom-
plished in the situation in which segregation was required by
state law. The assimilation process is now complete, both with
respect to the existence of the constitutional violation and
with respect to the obligation to redress that violation. Re-
gardless of how the de jure segregation came into being, the
substantive right is the right to attend school in a school sys-
tem in which there presently exist no vestiges of de jure
segregation.
139 99 S. Ct. at 2962.
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C. The Present Nature of the Right: A Retrospective View
Under the present state of the law, then, the nature of
the substantive right relates to the situation prevailing in the
school system in which children are enrolled, rather than to
the situation of the child who is compelled to attend a racially
identifiable school. It has thus been assumed that where de
jure segregation cannot be established, the school authorities
can constitutionally maintain racially identifiable schools,
even where it would not be impracticable to desegregate
them.140 The focus on the situation prevailing in the school
system emerges very clearly in Milliken v. Bradley. 1 4 While
Milliken I concerned only the remedial powers of the federal
courts to impose interdistrict desegregation in order to elimi-
nate effectively the condition of de jure segregation found to
exist in the urban school district,142 and while an inter-district
remedy may be imposed in some cases, 43 the Court made it
clear that the black children residing in the de jure segregated
urban school system had no substantive right to attend a ra-
cially integrated school. As the Court stated:
The constitutional right of the Negro respondents residing
in Detroit is to attend a unitary school system in the dis-
trict .... The view of the dissenters, that the existence of a
dual system in Detroit can be made the basis for a decree
requiring cross-district transportation of pupils cannot be
supported on the grounds that it represents merely the de-
vising of a suitably flexible remedy for the violation of rights
already established by our prior decisions. It can be sup-
ported only by drastic expansion of the constitutional right
itself, an expansion without any support in either constitu-
tional principle or precedent. 144
The desegregation of many of the racially identifiable schools
in the Detroit school system by a remedy involving the adja-
140 See note 51 supra and accompanying text for citation to federal circuits
which have made this assumption.
141 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
"2 Id. at 753 (Stewart, J., concurring). See also the discussion in Hills v. Gau-
treaux, 425 U.S. 284, 292-96 (1976).
:4 418 U.S. at 746-47 (footnote omitted).
44 Id. at 746-47.
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cent suburban school systems would have been fully practica-
ble.1 4 5 But since the nature of the substantive right relates to
the situation prevailing in the school system in which the
child is enrolled, rather than to attendance at a racially inte-
grated school, this practicability had no effect. So even where
the system in which the child is enrolled is a de jure segre-
gated school system, and even where it would not be impracti-
cable to desegregate the schools in that system by a remedy
involving adjacent school systems, children enrolled in that
system may still attend racially identifiable schools.1 e
Defining the nature of the substantive right with refer-
ence to the situation prevailing in the school system in which
the child is enrolled and making the existence of the right and
extent of the obligation depend on a finding of de jure segre-
gation raises serious questions of what may be called "com-
parative justice," both from the standpoint of children want-
ing to attend racially integrated schools and the school system
wanting to avoid being forced to integrate its schools.147 As
previously stated, in light of patterns of residential racial seg-
regation in urban areas, where the black population is prima-
rily concentrated,1 4 8 "neutral" geographic attendance zoning
as the basis of school assignment would result in a large num-
ber of racially identifiable schools, totally apart from state
laws requiring racial segregation or intentional school board
action trying to maximize such segregation.1 49 Similarly, be-
145 See the discussion of this point by the dissenters in Milliken L As Justice
White noted, the majority left "unchallenged the District Court's conclusion that a
plan including the suburbs would be physically easier and more practical and feasible
than a Detroit-only plan." 418 U.S. at 767. Justice Marshall pointed out that seven-
teen of the suburban systems included in the plan were contiguous to Detroit, and
the remainder were no more than eight miles outside Detroit's city limits; the maxi-
mum one-way travel time under the plan was forty minutes. 418 U.S. at 813. In
Swann, the Court had approved a desegregation plan involving one-way travel time
of up to thirty-five minutes. 402 U.S. at 30.
",8 Most of the black students in Detroit are still attending racially identifiable
schools. See Bradley v. Milliken, 540 F.2d 229 (6th Cir. 1976), aff'd. sub nom. Milli-
ken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 367 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Milliken II].
1 7 For a discussion of the objection to racial integration made by school systems,
see notes 285-91 infra and accompanying text.
1" See notes 49-50 supra and accompanying text for demographic factors affect-
ing residential segregation.
119 This assumes the maximum reciprocal effect of school segregation and resi-
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cause of patterns of urban-suburban racial concentration in
metropolitan areas, 150 there may be a predominantly black ur-
ban school system with a large number of racially identifiable
black schools surrounded by predominantly white suburban
school systems with a large number of racially identifiable
white schools, totally apart from any actions of the school au-
thorities.151 I have discussed elsewhere the question of
whether governmental responsibility for existing patterns of
residential racial segregation and concentration renders the
resulting school segregation unconstitutional and subject to
redress, 52 and will not repeat that discussion here. The point
to be emphasized at this juncture is that it is the patterns of
residential racial segregation, interacting with geographic at-
tendance zoning, that must be seen as the primal cause of
school segregation today.153 If it were not for patterns of resi-
dential racial segregation, the invalidation of state laws re-
quiring school segregation in Brown and of so-called "freedom
of choice" plans in Green would have been sufficient to bring
about desegregated schools in states where segregation was re-
quired by state law. If it were not for those patterns, school
authorities in states where segregation was not required by
state law would not have been in a position to engage in in-
tentionally segregative acts designed to maximize actual segre-
gation, and probably would not have been motivated to do
sO.15 Once we acknowledge that it is the patterns of residen-
tial racial segregation, interacting with geographic attendance
zoning, that are the primal cause of school segregation, we
may properly inquire whether the nature of the substantive
dential segregation. See note 44 supra for a discussion of this reciprocal effect and
citation to supporting authorities.
'5 See generally U.S. COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN SUBURBIA
(1974).
M5 See notes 7-9 supra and accompanying text for examples of this situation and
various judicial responses to it.
152 See the discussion in Beyond Bakke, supra note 2, at 151-53, and in Sedler,
Discussion of Papers, 10 URB. REV. 149, 153-54 (1978).
153 See generally Farley, supra note 47, and Wolfe, Northern School Desegrega-
tion and Residential Choice, 1977 Sup. CT. REV. 63.
154 The desire on the part of whites for racially and socially homogeneous schools
is reflective of their desire for racially and socially homogeneous residential
neighborhoods.
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constitutional right should be defined with reference to state
laws dealing with school segregation or the actions of school
authorities, as reflected in the concept of de jure segregation.
Another problem with the concept of de jure segregation
as the basis of the substantive right is that it makes the con-
stitutional entitlement of children to attend, and the obliga-
tion of the state to provide, racially integrated schools at the
present time depend in large measure on what happened in
the school system at some time in the past. In states where
school segregation was required by state law at the time of
Brown, the discrimination effected against other children in
the past entitles children now enrolled in the school system to
attend racially integrated schools to the maximum extent fea-
sible.155 In other states, the entitlement of children to attend
racially integrated schools depends on whether at some time
in the past, the school authorities caused a relatively small
number of the schools in the system to become racially identi-
fiable by their intentionally segregative actions. Thus, in Co-
lumbus, because as of 1954 the school authorities maintained
an "enclave of separate, black schools on the near east side of
Columbus ' 15 6 consisting of five black schools, only three of
which remained in operation at the time the litigation arose,
they were required to adopt a desegregation plan involving
some 172 schools; 157 in Dayton, since in 1954, the school au-
thorities were maintaining four black schools that had become
so as a result of intentionally segregative actions.15 8 They were
required to desegregate the forty-seven racially identifiable
schools in the sixty-eight school system.1 59 Again, the inten-
tional segregation practiced against black children prior to
1954 redounded to the benefit of children attending school in
that school system in the 1970's. On the other hand, children
enrolled in the Grand Rapids, Michigan school system in the
165 As pointed out previously, in those states today a much higher proportion of
black children in fact are attending racially integrated schools than in states where
segregration was not required by state law. See note 43 supra for citation to support-
ing authority.
"1 99 S. Ct. at 2946.
15 99 S. Ct. at 2962 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
158 99 S. Ct. at 2978.
"I Id. at 2980-81.
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1970's were not able to compel the school authorities to deseg-
regate the schools, because there was no showing that the
school authorities in the past had engaged in intentionally
segregative acts. 60 Children enrolled in the Lansing, Michigan
school system and the Kalamazoo, Michigan school system
were more fortunate in this regard, because they could make
the requisite showing of past intentional segregation.' It is
difficult to see why the right of children to compel the deseg-
regation of the schools, and in all likelihood, to be able to at-
tend racially integrated schools, should depend on things that
happened before most of the children were born.6 2 Finally,
the de jure segregation doctrine, as regards its application to
dual school systems in part, as illustrated by Columbus-Day-
ton, does not even purport to redress the present segregation
that was "predominantly caused" by the past unconstitutional
action. Most of the segregation required to be redressed in
these circumstances is that which has come about because of
the school authorities' subsequent breach of their normative
obligation to prevent other schools from becoming racially
identifiable. 6"
All of this suggests that it is appropriate to make a fur-
ther inquiry into the nature of the substantive right, and to
ask whether the focus should be on a right of children to at-
tend racially integrated schools rather than on a right of chil-
dren to attend school in a system in which there presently ex-
ists no vestige of de jure segregation. What is lacking in the
Columbus-Dayton opinions, as was absent in Swann and in
Keyes-perhaps because the question was not directly raised
in any of these cases-is an explanation of why the right of a
110 Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
161 Oliver v. Kalamazoo Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 963 (1975); NAACP v. Lansing Bd. of Educ., 559 F.2d 1042 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 997 (1977).
162 See the discussion of the "past discrimination strategy" in Fiss, supra note
54, at 37-39. See also Yudoff, supra note 107, at 81.
162 And even where de jure segregation has been shown, as in Detroit, black chil-
dren may still not be able to attend racially integrated schools, if the system is
predominantly black, notwithstanding that it is surrounded by predominantly white
school systems, and that desegregation on a metropolitan basis would be feasible. See
notes 141-46 supra and accompanying text for an explanation and citation to illustra-
tive cases.
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child to attend a racially integrated school today should de-
pend upon the situation existing in the school system, as well
as upon a showing of intentional racial segregation on the part
of the state or the school authorities in the past. Rather, the
Court focused on past segregation creating a dual school sys-
tem, as a whole or in part, which the state had the continuing
and affirmative duty to dismantle, including the duty to pre-
vent any other racially identifiable schools from subsequently
developing. The past discrimination and affirmative duty
analysis may explain the state's obligation to remedy the con-
stitutional violation, but this analysis does not explain why
the existence of the constitutional right should be predicated
on a showing of past discrimination in the first place.
The focus, it is submitted, should be on the right of chil-
dren to attend a racially integrated school, and the obligation
of the state should be defined with reference to that right.
Under the present state of the law, it is just the reverse. The
issue is whether a violation exists with respect to the school
system, and the entitlement of children to attend a racially
integrated school depends on the existence of that violation.
The interest of the children in attending racially integrated
schools is not factored into the constitutional equation, and if
children do get to attend racially integrated schools, it is be-
cause they are the "incidental beneficiaries" of a violation
found to exist with respect to the school system. This result is
particularly anomalous since the predicate for the constitu-
tional violation is past discrimination, occurring before most
of the children now enrolled in the school system were born,
and which in a realistic sense was not the primal cause of
much of the actual segregation existing in the school system
at the present.
The deficiencies inherent in defining the nature of the
substantive right with reference to the situation prevailing in
the school system and in premising the existence of the right
on a finding of de jure segregation have long been recognized,
both by those who favor constitutionally required school de-
segregation and by those who do not. Professor Fiss, a strong
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proponent of constitutionally required school desegregation,""
has contended that in cases in which the Supreme Court has
come down with decisions furthering desegregation, its con-
cern has been with the "segregated pattern itself" rather than
with the past discrimination:
In Swann and Keyes there are incidents of past discrimina-
tion; but no one truly believed they were of much signifi-
cance-they were merely window dressing. In truth, respon-
sibility was attributed to the school board for the
segregation because that demographic pattern was a foresee-
able and avoidable consequence of using geographic criteria
for student assignment. Only this theory could fully explain
the Court's actions in Swann and Keyes.165
His view in this regard seems fortified by Columbus-Dayton,
in which the Court tied the demographic pattern" to the
school authorities' affirmative duty to dismantle the dual
school system in part, which was produced by their past dis-
crimination. Therefore, the great bulk of the segregation that
they were required to remedy was that resulting from their
breach of their affirmative duty rather than that resulting
from their past discrimination.
Professor Graglia, who strongly disagrees with the Court's
decisions in Swann and Keyes,16 6 attacks the requirement of
"segregative intent," and argues that, "a requirement of inte-
gration must be of nationwide application, and justified, on its
own merits, as such.' 6 7 He contends that:
[When an action, such as the use of neighborhood assign-
ment in a racially imbalanced neighborhood, has both de-
sired and undesired consequences, a value judgment as to
gains and losses is unavoidably involved. To purport to test
the legality of the action by "intent" is only to make the
'" See Fiss, supra note 54; Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The
Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARv. L. RE v. 764 (1965) [hereinafter referred to as Ra-
cial Imbalance]; Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case - Its Significance for North-
ern School Desegregation, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 697 (1971); Fiss, The Jurisprudence of
Busing, 39 L. AND CONTEMP. PROB. 194 (1975).
"I Fiss, supra note 54, at 35.
166 L. GRAGLIA, supra note 30, at 116-26, 161-97.
167 Id. at 84.
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basis of that judgment obscure.168
Professor Fiss makes the same point when he says that
"[c]onsistency can only be achieved if we abandon the illusory
search for the incidents of past discrimination and address in
a direct and explicit way the hard question-is a segregated
pattern of student attendance harmful, and if so, how harm-
ful? '16 9 It is this question which the Court has not yet
addressed.
In Keyes, Justices Douglas and Powell, reasoning from
different directions and reaching different conclusions as to
the scope of the state's obligation to provide racially inte-
grated schools,170 did address this question, and both urged
the Court to recognize a constitutional obligation independent
of the concept of de jure segregation. Justice Douglas con-
tended that such an obligation existed because school segrega-
tion, regardless of the particular manner in which it came
about, was the "product of state actions or policies."171
Justice Powell developed his position much more fully.
He first noted that the root cause of school segregation was
residential racial segregation,72 and that the existence of resi-
dential racial segregation was not related to whether or not a
state had laws requiring school segregation.73 He went on to
say that the concept of de jure segregation was useful only in
explaining the unconstitutionality of state laws requiring ra-
cially segregated schools, and that the concept should not be
used to equate "segregative intent" with such laws, as the
Court did in Keyes.17 4
But the key element in Justice Powell's rejection of the
de jure segregation concept was his view as to the nature of
168 Id. at 186.
169 Fiss, supra note 54, at 39.
170 Justice Douglas did not expressly discuss the remedy question in his opinion,
but he said nothing to indicate that the requirement was anything less than the maxi-
mum feasible degree of integration. 413 U.S. at 214-17. Justice Powell, in contrast,
would not require the use of extensive student transportation to bring about integra-
tion. 413 U.S. at 242-52.
171 413 U.S. at 216.
171 Id. at 222-23.
173 Id. at 223.
174 Id. at 224-25.
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the substantive right involved in school desegregation cases.1
He contended that children possess the right to attend school
in an integrated school system rather than the right to attend
school in a school system in which there presently exists no
vestiges of de jure segregation, and that the constitutional
rights of black children should not depend upon a showing of
de jure segregation in the particular school district.176 He
stated:
Public schools are creatures of the State, and whether the
segregation is state-created or state-assisted or merely state-
perpetuated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle.
The school board exercises pervasive and continuing respon-
sibility over the long-range planning as well as the daily op-
erations of a public school system. It sets policies on attend-
ance zones, faculty employment and assignments, school
construction, closings and consolidations, and myriad other
matters. School board decisions obviously are not the sole
cause of segregated school conditions. But if, after such de-
tailed and complete public supervision, substantial school
segregation still persists, the presumption is strong that the
school board, by its acts or omissions, is in some part re-
sponsible. Where state action and supervision are so perva-
sive and where, after years of such action, segregated schools
continue to exist within the district to a substantial degree,
this Court is justified in finding a prima facie case of a con-
stitutional violation. The burden then must fall on the
school board to demonstrate it is operating an "integrated
school system."1
At the same time, however, he would not recognize a constitu-
tional right to attend a racially integrated school, and he
views the scope of the obligation to operate an "integrated
school system" as being somewhat limited.178
The California Supreme Court has gone further in re-
175 As he noted: "At the outset, one must try to identify the constitutional right
which is being enforced. This is not easy, as the precedents have been far from ex-
plicit." Id. at 225.
178 Id. at 225-32.
177 Id. at 227-28.
178 Id. at 242-52; see note 170 supra for reference to Justice Powell's view on the
limits of a school board's duty to use transportation to accomplish integration.
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jecting the concept of de jure segregation and has held that
the equal protection clause of the California Constitution im-
poses on school authorities in that state "a constitutional obli-
gation to take reasonably feasible steps to alleviate school seg-
regation." 117  The court emphasized that school segregation
inflicts a "racially specific harm" on minority children which
is of the same gravity regardless of how the segregation came
into being.18 0 The court concluded:
In light of the detrimental consequences that segregated
schools have traditionally imposed on minority children, and
a school boards' plenary authority over the governance of its
schools, a school board in this state is not constitutionally
free to adopt any facially neutral policy it chooses, oblivious
to such policy's actual differential impact on the minority
children in its schools.1 81
The California electorate, however, recently has adopted an
amendment to the state constitution that would appear to re-
quire a showing of "segregative intent" as a predicate for
court-ordered school desegregation in that state as well.182 In
any event, the opinions of Justice Douglas and Justice Powell
in Keyes, and the position of the California Supreme Court
indicate some judicial dissatisfaction with the present ap-
proach to defining the nature of the substantive right with re-
spect to school desegregation.
This section has analyzed the nature of the substantive
right as it has been defined by the Supreme Court's current
doctrine. As discussed, the nature of the right relates to the
situation prevailing in the school system in which the child is
enrolled and depends upon a showing of intentional racial seg-
regation on the part of the state or the school authorities. The
deficiencies inherent in such an approach and the anomalies
1M9 Crawford v. Board of Educ., 551 P.2d 28, 34 (Cal. 1976).
ISo Id. at 37-38.
181 Id. at 38.
... CAL. CONST. art. I, § 7(a), as amended by Senate Const. Amend. No. 2, West's
Calif. Leg. Serv. 1979, 75-76. The thrust of the amendment is to require that the
California Constitution be interpreted coextensively with the fourteenth amend-
ment's equal protection clause "with espect to the use of pupil school assignment or
pupil transportation."
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that result from its application have been pointed out. Now
inquiry will focus upon whether the values embodied in the
Constitution require recognition of a right relating to attend-
ance at a racially integrated school, and if so, upon the scope
of the state's obligation to provide for attendance at racially
integrated schools.
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ATTEND A RACIALLY
INTEGRATED SCHOOL:
AN ANALYSIS AND A JUSTIFICATION
Analysis in this section will involve separate considera-
tion of a constitutional right on the part of children to attend
a racially integrated school and, if such a right is found to
exist, of the state's obligation to provide for attendance at ra-
cially integrated schools. Separate consideration of the right
and of the obligation is necessary because the justification
that will be advanced for the recognition of the right relates to
the balancing of the interests of children in attending a ra-
cially integrated school against the interests of the state in not
being required to operate racially integrated schools. If such a
right is found to exist, a further balancing is involved in deter-
mining the scope of the state's obligation to implement that
right.18 3
The source of a substantive right to attend racially inte-
grated schools must be found in constitutional values. My
submission is that these values require recognition of an inter-
est on the part of children in attending racially integrated
schools, and that in light of those values, the interest in at-
tending racially integrated schools constitutionally outweighs
any interest that can be asserted by the state to justify its
operation of racially identifiable or "factually segregated"
schools.
For purposes of this analysis, assume the absence of state
laws mandating racial segregation in the schools or of inten-
tional actions on the part of school authorities designed to
s83 The distinction between the existence of the substantive right and the scope
of the state's obligation to implement that right is illustrated by Justice Powell's view
of a "genuinely integrated school system" in Keyes.
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maximize actual segregation, that is, assume the absence of de
jure segregation. In this regard there is agreement with the
position taken by Justice Powell in Keyes that "[p]ublic
schools are creatures of the State, and whether the segrega-
tion is state-created or state-assisted or merely state-perpetu-
ated should be irrelevant to constitutional principle."1'' As
stated previously, the primal cause of school segregation in
the urban school systems, in which the great majority of black
children are enrolled, is residential racial segregation interact-
ing with geographic attendance zoning as the basis of student
assignment.18 5 The question thus becomes whether it is con-
stitutional for school authorities to use geographic attendance
zoning as the basis of student assignment when, because of
residential racial segregation, this results in a large number of
racially identifiable schools and denies many of the children
in the school system the opportunity to attend racially inte-
grated schools. This question was specifically left open by the
Court in Keyes.1 88
Where the school authorities use geographic attendance
zoning as the basis of student assignment, with full awareness
of existing patterns of residential racial segregation, in any re-
alistic sense they "intend" to produce racially identifiable
schools, and for constitutional purposes can be held responsi-
ble for this consequence.1 87 This is not a circumstance in
184 413 U.S. at 227.
185 See notes 148-54 supra and accompanying text for an explanation.
186 As the Court stated: "We have no occasion to consider in this case whether a
'neighborhood school policy' of itself will justify racial or ethnic concentrations in the
absence of a finding that school authorities have committed acts constituting de jure
segregation." 413 U.S. at 212. However, in Swann, the Court did say that the exis-
tence of predominantly black and predominantly white schools, without more, does
not offend the fourteenth amendment, 402 U.S. at 24, and it has cited Keyes for the
proposition that the existence of racially segregated schools is not unconstitutional
without a showing of segregative intent. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S 229, 240
(1976); Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413 (1977). Nonetheless, the
question was left open in Keyes, and it has never been presented squarely to the
Court.
1817 See the discussion in Fiss, Racial Imbalance, supra note 164, at 583-85. As he
puts it:
The school board's responsibility for the maintenance of imbalanced
schools, even under the policies of approval or disregard, is derived from its
deliberate choice to assign children to schools on the basis of geographic
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which racially neutral actions produce an unintended "racially
disproportionate impact" or a "racially discriminatory ef-
fect."18 8 The racially identifiable schools are the natural and
foreseeable consequences of the use of geographic attendance
zoning as the basis for student assignment when residential
patterns are known to the school authorities to be racially seg-
regated. As regards the intention to produce racial conse-
quences, then, the use of geographic attendance zoning as the
basis of student assignment can properly be analogized to
state laws requiring school segregation. In both instances
there is the use of what is in fact race-conscious criteria: when
the school authorities make a decision to use geographic at-
tendance zoning as the basis of student assignment, they have
made a conscious decision to produce racially identifiable
schools in the same manner as did the state legislature when
it required school segregation by law.
The so-called "discriminatory intent" requirement is but
another way of saying that the party challenging governmen-
tal action as being racially discriminatory must show that the
government has in fact used race-conscious criteria.189 It is for
this reason that "segregative intent" on the part of the school
authorities in school systems located in states where segrega-
tion was not required by state law properly could be assimi-
lated to state laws requiring school segregation.1 90 But "segre-
gative intent" has no independent significance for purposes of
constitutional analysis, and the absence of "segregative in-
tent," as defined in the context of de jure segregation, cannot
furnish a constitutional justification for the maintenance of
racially segregated schools. Because the constitutional analysis
criteria when it knows that, given the ghettoized residential patterns, the
implementation of this choice will yield racially imbalanced schools.
Id. at 584.
I" Therefore, this circumstance is unlike cases such as Washington v. Davis, 426
U.S. 229, 240 (1976) and that involved in Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan
Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). On the subject generally, see Perry, The Dispropor-
tionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540 (1977).
I'l See Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S.
587 (1935); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886). Cf. Personnel Administrator v.
Feeney, 99 S. Ct. 2282 (1979).
I9 See notes 51-68 supra and accompanying text for a general explanation of
this concept.
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must be in terms of constitutional values, the question is
whether geographic attendance zoning as the basis of student
assignment, which foreseeably results in the existence of ra-
cially identifiable schools and denies children the opportunity
to attend racially integrated schools, is consistent with consti-
tutional values.
To answer that question, consideration requires focus
first on precisely why segregation mandated by state law191 is
unconstitutional. Second, the reasons that make segregation
unconstitutional when mandated by state law will be ex-
amined as they relate to making segregation unconstitutional
when it is the foreseeable result of the use of geographic at-
tendance zoning for student assignments. Third, consideration
will center on the interests that the state can assert in support
of the use of geographic attendance zoning and show that, on
balance, those interests are constitutionally insufficient to jus-
tify required assignment to racially identifiable schools. Fi-
nally, analysis will demonstrate that the scope of the state's
constitutional obligation is to provide for attendance at ra-
cially integrated schools to the maximum extent feasible, in-
cluding, where necessary, the assignment of students across
existing school district lines.
A. The Unconstitutionality of De Jure Segregation: Brown
and Bolling in Contemporary Perspective
There has been very extensive commentary about the
holding and rationale of Brown v. Board of Education.192 On
the other hand, there has been relatively little analysis of the
Court's holding in the companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe,193
which invalidated compulsory segregation in the District of
Columbia schools. Boiling clearly was an appendage to
Brown,194 but, as will be demonstrated, the rationale of Boll-
19' Segregation intentionally brought about by the acts of the school authorities
is included in this discussion.
192 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
193 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
194 As the Court noted: "In view of our decision that the Constitution prohibits
the states from maintaining racially segregated public schools, it would be unthink-
able that the same Constitution would impose a lesser duty on the Federal Govern-
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ing is more in accord with the Court's constitutional doctrine
in regard to racial equality. The holding and rationale of
Brown and Boiling will now be reexamined in light of this
doctrine in order to set forth a more precise rationale for the
unconstitutionality of de jure segregation.
In stare decisis terms, it is fair to say, as Justice Powell
did in Keyes, that the holding in Brown was "essentially nega-
tive." He explained:
The great contribution of Brown I was its holding in unmis-
takable terms that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
state-compelled or state-authorized segregation of public
schools. Although some of the language was more expansive,
the holding in Brown I was essentially negative: It was im-
permissible under the Constitution for the States, or their
instrumentalities to force children to attend segregated
schools.195
The rationale for the holding of unconstitutionality was that
racially segregated schools were "inherently unequal," so that
required attendance at such schools deprived black children
of equal protection of the laws. 196
Brown was lawyered within the framework of the separate
but equal doctrine.1 9 7 Building on the framework established
in the graduate school cases of Sweatt v. Painter,198 and
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 9 9 the lawyers for the
black children tried to show that racial segregation in educa-
tion was "unequal," because racially segregated education was
harmful to black children and deprived them of some of the
benefits they would receive if they were attending racially in-
tegrated schools. Since racially segregated schools were com-
pelled by state law, the approach was to compare attendance
at segregated schools with attendance at integrated schools in
terms of the impact on black children. The Court in Brown
ment." Id. at 500.
413 U.S. at 220 (citations omitted).
347 U.S. at 495.
197 For a detailed and vivid discussion of that very careful lawyering, see R.
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 287-540 (1976).
198 347 U.S. at 495.
19 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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found that attendance at racially segregated schools produced
the following harms to black children. First, relying on Sweatt
and McLaurin, it found that racial segregation deprived black
children of the intangible benefits connected with interracial
education, which may be summarized as the opportunity to
associate with white children during the educational process,
to exchange ideas with them, and to learn how to live in a
multiracial society.20 0 Important as these intangible benefits
were in the context of graduate education, in the Court's view,
they were even more important in the context of primary and
secondary education.0 1 Second, the Court found that segrega-
tion in public schools, with the sanction of law, creates feel-
ings of inferiority in black children, which, in the school set-
ting, adversely affects their motivation to learn.202 Because
compelled attendance at racially segregated schools produced
these harms to black children, it "deprived them of some of
the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated school
system. '20 3 Thus, racially segregated schools were "inherently
unequal" and the black children required to attend them were
deprived of equal protection of the laws.20 4
The question arises as to how the Court "knew" that
there were certain intangible benefits connected with interra-
cial education and that state-imposed segregation created
feelings of inferiority in black children, adversely affecting
their motivation to learn. There has been much debate about
the validity and significance of the social science testimony in-
troduced by the plaintiffs in Brown, designed to show the
harmful effects of segregated education on black children.20 5
But no social science evidence was introduced with respect to
200 347 U.S. at 493-94.
201 See the discussion of this point in Fiss, Racial Imbalance, supra note 164, at
588-91; Heyman, The Chief Justice, Racial Segregation, and the Friendly Critics, 49
CAL. L. REv. 104, 106-10, (1961); Wisdom, Random Remarks on the Role of Social
Sciences in the Judicial Decision-Making Process in School Desegregation Cases, 39
L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 134, 141-42 (1975).
202 347 U.S. at 494.
203 Id. at 494-95.
204 Id.
201 Compare, e.g., Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U.L. REv. 150, 157-68 (1955),
with Clark, The Desegregation Cases: Criticism of the Social Scientist's Role, 5 VL.
L. REv. 224, 227-40 (1959).
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the intangible benefits connected with interracial education,
just as no such evidence had been introduced in Sweatt or
McLaurin. In Sweatt and McLaurin, however, the Justices
could draw directly on their own knowledge and experience in
regard to law school and graduate education. As Chief Justice
Vinson stated for the Court in Sweatt:
Moreover, although the law is a highly learned profession,
we are well aware that it is an intensely practical one. The
law school, the proving ground for legal learning and prac-
tice, cannot be effective in isolation from the individuals and
institutions with which the law interacts. Few students and
no one who has practiced law would choose to study in an
academic vacuum, removed from the interplay of ideas and
the exchange of views with which the law is concerned. The
law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner ex-
cludes from its student body members of the racial groups
which number 85% of the population of the State and in-
clude most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and
other officials with whom petitioner will inevitably be deal-
ing when he becomes a member of the Texas Bar. With such
a substantial and significant segment of society excluded, we
cannot conclude that the education offered petitioner is sub-
stantially equal to that which he would receive if admitted
to the University of Texas Law School.208
Similarly, in McLaurin, where a black graduate student was
internally segregated,0 7 Chief Justice Vinson observed that
"[t]he result is that appellant is handicapped in his pursuit of
effective graduate instruction. Such restrictions impair and in-
hibit his ability to study, to engage in discussions and ex-
change views with other students, and, in general, to learn his
profession." 08 When Chief Justice Warren stated in Brown
that, "[s]uch considerations apply with added force to chil-
dren in grade and high schools,"20 he likewise was drawing
206 339 U.S. at 634.
20" The student was required to sit apart at a designated desk in an anteroom
adjoining the classroom, to sit at a designated desk on the mezzanine floor of the
library, and to sit at a designated table and to eat at a different time from the other
students in the school cafeteria. 339 U.S. at 640.
208 Id. at 641.
209 347 U.S. at 494.
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upon the "background knowledge of educated [persons] who
live in the world,' 2 1 0 as judges necessarily must do in perform-
ing the judicial task."' "Amateur wisdom" and simple com-
mon sense tell us that the denial of interracial associations
during the educational process impairs the educational oppor-
tunities of children, particularly minority children. Just as law
school education goes beyond learning how to read a case, pri-
mary and secondary school education goes beyond the learn-
ing of the cognitive skills and is designed to prepare children
to live as adults. Children of both races do not learn how to
live in a multiracial society when they are compelled to attend
one-race schools. Minority children suffer the additional harm
of not learning how to relate to a white-dominated society
when they attend school only with other minority children.
The intangible benefits of interrracial association during the
educational process were obvious to the Justices in Brown,
just as they were obvious in Sweatt and McLaurin. It was on
this basis that the Court in Brown found that racial segrega-
tion in the schools caused harm to the black children.
As to the finding that state-imposed segregation in the
schools created feelings of inferiority in black children which
adversely affected their motivation to learn, the Court made
reference to a finding of fact in this regard by the district
court in Brown.21 2 It then noted that the finding was "amply
supported by modern authority," and in the celebrated foot-
note eleven, cited social science research, some of which was
presented to the district court by the plaintiffs' expert wit-
nesses.21 3 It should be noted in this regard that there was no
finding that black children attending racially integrated
schools would have higher levels of academic achievement in
regard to the cognitive skills 14 than black children attending
segregated schools. No such evidence was available at that
time, and as the plaintiffs' expert witnesses had testified, it
230 Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426
(1960).
211 Id. at 426-27.
212 347 U.S. at 494.
213 Id.
224 Congitive skills refer to the verbal, mathematical and similar "tangible knowl-
edge" skills.
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was not possible to separate the psychologically damaging ef-
fects of segregated schools from the psychologically damaging
effects of other forms of state-imposed segregation. 15 What
the plaintiffs were trying to show was that the system of state-
imposed segregation contributed to feelings of inferiority in
black children, and the social science testimony was intro-
duced to support this contention.
In retrospect, the social science testimony was unneces-
sary. It is agreed by almost every commentator that the social
science testimony had no real impact on the Court's deci-
sion-as indicated by the fact that it was only given a foot-
note reference.216 The Court simply stated that "[tio separate
them from others of similar age and qualifications solely be-
cause of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone. ' 217 The Court also
agreed with the district court that "the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of
the Negro group. ' m S The Court in Plessy v. Ferguson,"' it
will be recalled, likewise made a finding about the effect of
state-imposed racial segregation in public facilities:
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's ar-
gument to consist in the assumption that the enforced sepa-
ration of the two races stamps the colored race with a badge
of inferiority. If this be so, it is not by reason of anything
found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses
to put that construction upon it.220
This finding was rejected specifically by the Court in Brown22'
when it found that state-imposed segregation denotes the in-
:15 See Clark, supra note 205, at 231.
16 See Black, supra note 210, at 430 n.25; Goodman, De Facto School Segrega-
tion: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REv. 275, 279 (1972),
Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. Rv. 1, 32-
33 (1959); Wisdom, supra note 201, at 141-143; Yudoff, Equal Educational Opportu-
nity and the Courts, 51 Tax. L. Rv. 411, 437-42 (1973).
217 347 U.S. at 494.
:18 Id.
219 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
220 Id. at 551.
221 347 U.S. at 494-95.
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feriority of the Negro group, and, as applied to black children
required to attend racially segregated schools, "generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that
may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be
undone.
222
The basis for the Court's finding in Brown as to the effect
of state-imposed segregation denoting the inferiority of blacks
was the same as the basis for its finding as to the intangible
benefits of interracial association in the educational process:
the background knowledge of judges living in American soci-
ety. A "legal system operates within the matrix of the facts,
circumstances, and value patterns obtaining in the social or-
der. '223 When the Court decided Brown, it was not analyzing
an abstract question about race relations. It was deciding
whether the segregation imposed by law in the twentieth cen-
tury in certain American states was unconstititional, and as
Professor Black put it, it had to decide that question "on the
ground of history and common knowledge about the facts of
life in the times and places aforesaid. '224 The Supreme Court
Justices, like anyone else living in American society at that
time, knew about segregation, and that it was a "massive in-
tentional disadvantaging of the Negro race, as such, by state
law. '225 It was set up for the purpose of keeping a whole race
of people inferior, it had come "down in apostolic succession"
from slavery, and was "an integral part of the movement to
maintain and further white supremacy. "228 As Judge Sobeloff
explained Brown: "Brown articulated the truth that Plessy
chose to disregard: that relegation of blacks to separate facili-
ties represents a declaration by the state that they are inferior
and not to be associated with. ' 227 The Court found state-im-
posed segregation unconstitutional, in the view of Professor
222 Id. at 494.
223 Cahn, Jurisprudence, 31 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 182, 184 (1956).
224 Black, supra note 210, at 427.
225 Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 28 (1959); Black, supra note 210, at 421.
226 Id. at 424-25. As regards segregation and "white supremacy," see also the dis-
cussion in notes 249-50 infra and accompanying text.
227 Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 825 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J.,
concurring).
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Black, because, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment commands
equality, and segregation as we know it is inequality."228
The harm rationale for the holding of Brown is twofold.
State-imposed segregation in the public schools causes harm
to black children in that it (1) deprives them of the opportu-
nity for interracial associations during the educational proc-
ess, and (2) causes feelings of inferiority in black children,
which, in the school setting, adversely affects their motivation
to learn. As Professor Fiss has observed, Brown was decided
on the basis of the principle of equal educational opportunity,
and the Court made the "requisite empirical and normative
judgments" necessary to find that segregated education vio-
lated this principle.229 This finding of harm, based on the
background knowledge of judges, was the rationale for the
holding in Brown that state-imposed racial segregation in the
public schools deprived black children of equal educational
opportunity, and thus, of equal protection of the laws. While
it is true, as Professor Heyman has contended, "that the opin-
ion did not imply that absent a finding of 'harm' racial segre-
gation would be constitutional, ' 230 the fact remains that this
finding was essential to the Court's rationale and to the
framework in which Brown was decided.
It must be emphasized again, however, that Brown did
not rest on any finding of "academic achievement" harm.
That is, the Court did not find in Brown, and there was no
contention to this effect, that black children attending racially
integrated schools would have higher levels of academic
3 28 Black, supra note 210, at 428. As Professor Cahn put it:
So one speaks in terms of the most familiar and universally accepted
standards of right and wrong when one remarks (1) that racial segregation
under government auspices inevitably inflicts humiliation, and (2) that offi-
cial humiliation of innocent, law-abiding citizens is psychologically harmful
and morally evil.... For at least twenty years, hardly any cultivated per-
son has questioned that segregation is cruel to Negro school children. The
cruelty is obvious and evident. Fortunately, it is so very obvious that the
Justices of the Supreme Court could see it and act on it even after reading
the labored attempts by plaintiffs' experts to demonstrate it
"scientifically."
Cahn, supra note 205, at 159.
229 Fiss, Racial Imbalance, supra note 164, at 594-95.
230 Heyman, supra note 201, at 105.
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achievement in the cognitive sense than black children at-
tending racially segregated schools. 31 While it is logical to as-
sume, as the Court did, that the feelings of inferiority result-
ing from state-imposed segregation would, in the school
setting, adversely affect motivation to learn, such motivation
is only one factor relating to academic achievement. Depend-
ing on the presence or absence of other factors, academic
achievement levels of black children at particular segregated
schools could be higher than the academic achievement levels
of black children at particular integrated schools, and vice
versa. But for the particular black child, the removal of state-
imposed segregation and the resultant feelings of inferiority
would contribute to improved motivation to learn. In any
event, regardless of its effect on academic achievement, state-
imposed segregation was found to cause specific racial harms
to black children and for this reason was held in Brown to be
a denial of equal protection of the laws.
The plaintiffs in Brown had challenged state-imposed
segregation in the schools on both equal protection and due
process grounds. Since the Court rested its decision on equal
protection grounds, it was unnecessary to consider whether
such segregation also was violative of due process. 23 2 In Boil-
ing, however, which involved a challenge to federally-man-
dated segregation in the District of Columbia schools, textual
support for the invalidation of such segregation had to be
found in the fifth amendment's due process clause. At that
time, the Court had not yet held that whatever would be a
violation of the equal protection clause when practiced by the
state was also a violation of the fifth amendment's due process
clause when practiced by the federal government, absent a
countervailing federal interest that was not present when the
2S, It is thus irrelevant in school desegregation cases whether integration will or
will not improve the academic achievement of black children, and evidence as to the
effect of integration on academic achievement has generally been held to be inadmis-
sible. Brunson v. Board of Trustees, 429 F.2d 820, 826 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J.,
concurring); Stall v. Savannah-Chatham County Bd. of Educ., 333 F.2d 55 (5th Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); Bradley v. Miliken, 345 F. Supp. 914, 931
(E.D. Mich. 1972). See also Yudoff, supra note 216, at 439-45; Wisdom, supra note
201, at 143-45.
232 347 U.S. at 495.
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state acted.2 "3 But the Court did note in Bolling that "the
concepts of equal protection and due process, both stemming
from our American ideal of fairness, are not mutually exclu-
sive," and stated that, "discrimination may be so unjustifiable
as to be violative of due process. "234
Using a due process analysis, the Court found that com-
pulsory racial segregation in the schools involved a racial clas-
sification that implicated important liberty interests. Since
"liberty" within the meaning of the due process clause "ex-
tends to the full range of conduct which the individual is free
to pursue,'235 it includes the right to attend school with chil-
dren of another race and to associate with those children dur-
ing the educational process. That liberty "cannot be restricted
except for a proper governmental objective. '23 The Court
then stated simply that, "[s]egregation in public education is
not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective,
and thus it imposes on Negro children of the District of Co-
lumbia a burden that constitutes an arbitrary deprivation of
their liberty in violation of the Due Process Clause. "237
Why, may it be asked, is segregation in public education
not reasonably related to any proper governmental objective?
If segregation in public education was not reasonably related
to any proper governmental objective, would this not be
equally true of state-imposed segregation in any public facil-
ity? But if this was so, then how could Bolling be reconciled
with Plessy, which was not discussed in the Boiling opinion?
In Plessy, the Court in effect did find that state-imposed seg-
regation in public facilities advanced a "proper governmental
objective": it maintained the "established usages, customs and
traditions of the people, and with a view to the promotion of
their comfort, and the preservation of 'the public peace and
good order." 238 This being so, it was reasonable, and hence,
constitutional for the state to require racial segregation in
23 See Mow Sun Wong v. Hampton, 426 U.S. 88, 99-100 (1976).
2S34 347 U.S. at 499.
235 Id.
236 Id. at 499-500.
2-7 Id. at 500.
23 163 U.S. at 550.
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public facilities.239
What happened, of course, was that Plessy was effectively
overruled in Brown, when the Court found that state-imposed
segregation "denote[s] the inferiority of the negro group. '2 40 It
cannot be a legitimate governmental purpose to promote the
supremacy of one racial group by separating it from the other
and "inferior" group with respect to the use of public facili-
ties. Such a purpose is inconsistent with the equality value of
the fourteenth amendment. In this sense, state-imposed racial
segregation was now equated with impermissible racial dis-
crimination: it constituted the use of race-conscious criteria
that interfered with the liberty of blacks to associate with
whites in the use of public facilities, which did not advance
any proper governmental objective, and thus was
unconstitutional.2 41
In a contemporary criticism of Brown, Professor Wechsler
argued that the matter of school segregation involved a con-
flict between the desires of blacks to associate with whites
during the educational process and the desire of whites to
avoid such association, and asked whether there was "a basis
in neutral principles for holding that the Constitution de-
mands that the claims for association should prevail. 2 42 The
answer, of course, is that the Constitution is not value neu-
tral.243 The values embodied in equal protection and due proc-
"', The Court relied on state court cases upholding school segregation laws. Id. at
544-45.
210 347 U.S. at 494. As Professor Perry has observed with respect to the "central
guiding principle" of Brown:
It is a notion of the moral equality of the races-the principle that no
person is morally inferior to another by virtue of race. Because race is not a
factor indicating anything about the moral worth of persons, race is morally
irrelevant to state laws and policies. Therefore, state action predicated on
the view that one person is by virtue of race inferior to another offends
equal protection.
Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and an Appraisal, 79 COLUM.
L. REv. 1023, 1030 (1979).
241 See Goodman, supra note 216, at 276-78.
242 Wechsler, supra note 216, at 34.
24 Pollak, supra note 225, at 31-32. See also the discussion of constitutional val-
ues and racial discrimination in Sedler, Racial Preference, Reality and the Constitu-
tion: Bakke v. Regents of the University of California, 17 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 329,
361-68 (1977).
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ess preclude constitutional recognition of any interest on the
part of whites to avoid associating with blacks in the use of
public facilities.244 If the choice is "between two kinds of free-
dom of association," the constitutional values dictate that the
choice be made in favor of the desire of blacks for "merged
participation in public life. '2 45
The Court's due process analysis in Bolling is therefore
somewhat different from its equal protection analysis in
Brown. State-imposed segregation in public education was un-
constitutional, not because it caused specific racial harm to
black children and deprived them of some of the benefits they
would have received in a racially integrated school system, but
because it interfered with their liberty to associate with white
children during the educational process, and because this in-
terference with liberty was not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective.
The post-Brown per curiams, invalidating state-imposed
segregation with respect to all public facilities, 246 are best ex-
plained under the Bolling rationale. While all state-imposed
segregation may be deemed to cause feelings of inferiority in
black people,247 state-imposed segregation is necessarily un-
constitutional under Boiling because it restricts the liberty of
blacks and whites to associate with each other in public facili-
ties, a restriction which is not reasonably related to any
proper governmental objective. State-imposed segregation
would be equally unconstitutional if, for example, racially seg-
regated public facilities were required in a city in which
blacks were in the political majority. It also does not matter
whether a due process or an equal protection analysis is em-
ployed when confronting state-imposed segregation. It can be
said that the forced separation of the races in public facilities
is an invidious racial classification violative of the equal pro-
244 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
245 Black, supra note 210, at 428. See also Heyman, supra note 201, at 114-15.
246 Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963); State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359
U.S. 533 (1959); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54
(1958); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v.
Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
247 State imposed segregation causes feelings of inferiority in blacks because it
constitutes "official disparagement." Cahn, supra note 205, at 155-56.
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tection clause,2 8 or that it is an unconstitutional interference
with the liberty of blacks and whites to associate with each
other in public facilities, in violation of the due process clause.
But whether the focus is on the racial classification or on the
restraint of liberty, the injury is to the right of interracial as-
sociation, and the interference with that right is unconstitu-
tional because compulsory segregation is not reasonably re-
lated to any proper governmental objective.
This explanation of the unconstitutionality of racial seg-
regation is fortified by Loving v. Virginia,49 in which the
Court used both an equal protection and a due process analy-
sis to invalidate state anti-miscegenation laws. The anti-mis-
cegenation laws, contained a racial classification that inter-
fered with the liberty of persons to marry each other; the only
purpose that the state could advance in support of the restric-
tion-"to preserve the racial integrity of its citizens"-was
found to be related to maintaining "white supremacy, ' '250 an
illegitimate governmental purpose.
The principle that emerges from Brown, Bolling, and the
post-Brown per curiams, as reflected in Loving, then, is that
compulsory racial segregation in the schools or other public
facilities is unconstitutional as violative of equal protection
and due process because (1) it interferes with the liberty of
blacks and whites to associate with each other in the use of
public facilities, and (2) such interference is unrelated to any
proper governmental objective. This principle is in accord
with the Court's general approach to the matter of impermis-
sible racial discrimination and the doctrine that it has devel-
oped in regard to racial equality. What the Constitution pro-
hibits is the use of race-conscious criteria causing detriment to
persons or groups where the use of such criteria does not ad-
vance "a valid and substantial governmental interest by what
the Court finds to be appropriate means. '251
2,8 See Wisdom, supra note 201, at 142-43.
249 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
210 The only interracial marriage proscribed was betwein whites and persons of
the "nonwhite" races. Persons of different "nonwhite" races were free to marry each
other. Id. at 11-12.
251 See Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 2, at 141-43.
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The value implicated by state-imposed segregation under
this analysis is the value of racial equality. Implementation
and protection of this value renders unconstitutional all use of
race-conscious criteria causing detriment to persons or groups
that does not advance a valid and substantial governmental
interest by what the Court finds to be appropriate means.
Such a use of race-conscious criteria constitutes impermissible
racial discrimination which "is unconstitutional whenever
practiced by the state, whether at the instance of whites or at
the instance of blacks, and whether the victims of such dis-
crimination are blacks, whites or both.
252
The fourteenth amendment, and the other Reconstruc-
tion Amendments, taken as a whole, also embody another
value, that of black freedom. As Professor Kinoy has stated:
[T]he main thrust of the Thirteenth, Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments was the construction of a penumbra of
legal commands which were designed to raise the race of
freedmen from the status of inferior beings-a status im-
posed by the system of chattel slavery-to that of free men
and women, equal participants in the hitherto white politi-
cal community consisting of the "people of the United
States." The constitutional right of the black race to this
status of freedom was the simple central objective of the Re-
construction Amendments. 253
The Supreme Court recognized the constitutional significance
of black freedom when it upheld the power of Congress, under
the implementing clause of the thirteenth amendment, to pro-
hibit racial discrimination by private persons as constituting
"badges and incidents of slavery. 25
4
In Professor Kinoy's view, Brown was a case strongly im-
plicating the black freedom value. As he stated:
They [the school cases] are, of course, not primarily about
education. They are about freedom for the Negro. Democ-
racy in this country cannot function without the participa-
252 Id. at 143.
252 Kinoy, The Constitutional Right of Negro Freedom, 21 RUTGERS L. REv. 388
(1967).
254 Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-44 (1968). See also Runyon v.
McCrary, 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
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tion of its Negro citizens, and it is this recognition which
underlies the school decisions. By a sweeping enunciation
the Court sought to fulfill its highest role. It finally felt the
necessity of assuming the responsibility no other branch of
the Government was prepared to meet. It sought to unclog
the threshold barriers to the black man's participation in
the process of democracy-the institutions of segregation in-
herited from slavery.2 55
Similarly, Judge Carter, one of the counsel for the plaintiffs in
Brown, has observed that "[a]s a result of this seminal deci-
sion, blacks had the right to use the main, not the separate
waiting room; to choose any seat on the bus; to relax in the
public parks on the same terms as any other member of the
community. This and more became their birthright under the
Constitution." '256 Under this rationale, therefore, all state-im-
posed segregation is unconstitutional because it is inconsistent
with the value of black freedom, as embodied in the Recon-
struction Amendments.
It is thus possible to divorce Brown from the harm ration-
ale which was advanced by the Court as the basis for its deci-
sion in that case, and from the educational context in which
the case was decided. Nonetheless, in Brown the Court did
find that state-imposed segregation in public education caused
specific racial harm to black children by (1) depriving them
of the opportunity for interracial associations during the edu-
cational process, and (2) causing them to suffer feelings of in-
feriority, which could adversely affect their motivation to
learn. That state-imposed segregation was found to cause this
specific racial harm to black children also may be relevant in
determining whether the operation of schools that are in fact
racially identifiable is likewise unconstitutional.
A precise rationale for the unconstitutionality of de jure
segregation may now be set forth. Absent any proper govern-
mental objective, the state cannot require racial segregation in
schools or in public facilities because this interferes with the
liberty of blacks and of whites to associate with each other in
21" Kinoy, supra note 253 at 429-30. See also Pollak, supra note 225 at 31-34.
25 Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 MICH. L. REV. 237, 246
(1968).
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those facilities. Secondly, such segregation in the school con-
text is unconstitutional because it results in specific racial
harm to black children during the educational process. In
terms of constitutional values, state-imposed segregation is in-
consistent with the values of racial equality and black free-
dom, embodied in the fourteenth amendment and the other
Reconstruction Amendments when analyzed in totality. Cen-
tral to this rationale, whether in terms of the interference
with the' liberty of blacks and whites to associate with each
other, or in terms of the specific racial harm caused to black
children, or in terms of implicating constitutional values, is
the absence of any justification for state-imposed segregation
in the public schools. Therefore, in contemporary perspective,
it is not difficult to understand why de jure segregation has
been declared unconstitutional. The question to which this ar-
ticle now turns is whether the rationale for invalidating de
jure segregation also may render unconstitutional the segrega-
tion that is the foreseeable result of the use of geographic at-
tendance zoning as the basis of student assignment.
B. The Right to Attend a Racially Integrated School: The
Brown-Boiling Rationale and Constitutional Values
The inquiry in this section of the writing is whether in
light of the Brown-Bolling rationale, the state may constitu-
tionally use geographic attendance zoning as the basis of stu-
dent assignment if it results in the required assignment of stu-
dents to schools that are, in fact, racially identifiable. As
stated previously, this analysis will involve separate considera-
tion of a constitutional right on the part of children to attend
a racially integrated school, and if such a right is found to
exist, of the state's obligation to provide for attendance at ra-
cially integrated schools. This section will focus on the exis-
tence of the constitutional right, and will assume that the
state could in fact operate racially integrated schools instead
of racially identifiable schools without a great degree of dislo-
cation. Using Justice Powell's view of a "genuinely integrated
school system" in Keyes as a model, 5 7 assume that racially
157 For a discussion of this model, see notes 176-178 supra and accompanying
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integrated schools could be attained by a redrawing of attend-
ance zone boundaries, by split zoning, by making school con-
struction and closure decisions with a view toward achieving
integration, and by utilizing transportation, to the extent that
it is provided, to promote integration. Instead, the school au-
thorities adhere to strict geographic attendance zoning, mak-
ing no attempt to bring about integration, but not manipulat-
ing anything to bring about segregation either.258
Much has been written about the "affirmative duty to in-
tegrate."2 59 The commentators generally have approached the
question in terms of the harm that is caused to black children
by required attendance at racially identifiable schools. It has
been suggested, for example, that in order for racial integra-
tion to be constitutionally required, it would have to be shown
that attendance at racially identifiable schools "inflicted the
same educational harm as the statutorily-imposed segregation
outlawed in Brown."260 Professor Fiss, who has long been a
proponent of a constitutionally-required duty to integrate, has
approached the question in terms of the denial of equal edu-
cational opportunity to a child required to attend a racially
identifiable school.261 He would find a duty to integrate if it is
proved that the racially identifiable school "is academically
inferior, that the child compelled to attend the school is de-
prived of important social relationships, or that the child suf-
fers personal harm. '262 He also notes that attendance at the
racially identifiable school could stigmatize the black child in
the same manner as if segregation were required by state
law.263 Finally, in relating integration to equality of educa-
tional opportunity, he concludes:
text.
2" For a case such as this see Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir.
1974).
2" Some of the major writings are Dimond, supra note 63; Fiss, Racial Imbal-
ance, supra note 164; Goodman, supra note 215; Yudoff, supra note 216.
06 Levin & Moise, School Desegregation Litigation in the Seventies and the
Use of Social Science Evidence: An Annotated Guide, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 50, 71
(1975).
211 Fiss appears to use the term "racially imbalanced" in the sense that we use
"racially identifiable." Fiss, Racial Imbalance, supra note 164, at 565.
262 Id. at 567-70.
163 Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case, supra note 164, at 697.
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Long familiar to the courts, this goal is linked to the fur-
therance of many objectives that cluster around the idea of
equality-assuring an equal distribution of resources among
the schools of the district, eliminating the badge of inferi-
ority imposed by placing blacks in separate schools, further-
ing the social contacts between racial classes, and reducing
the educational achievement gap between blacks and whites
by placing blacks in a setting dominated by the educational
advantages and aspirations of the majority class.2
This being so, he suggests that "the connection between the
idea of equality and integration may be so firm as to make
integration not only a constitutionally permissive goal but also
a constitutionally favored or required one. '2 6 5
The harm and denial of an equal educational opportunity
approach to the constitutionality of required attendance at ra-
cially identifiable schools is based, of course, on the harm ra-
tionale of Brown.266 In Brown, as previously observed, re-
quired attendance at de jure segregated schools was found to
cause specific educational and personal harm to black children
by depriving them of the opportunity for interracial associa-
tion during the educational process, and by causing them to
suffer feelings of inferiority, which, in the school setting, could
adversely affect their motivation to learn. Boiling, on the
other hand, related the lack of interracial association to the
restriction on the liberty of black children-and by implica-
tion on the liberty of white children- 2 7 to have interracial
associations during the educational process. Whether the in-
terference with the interest in interracial association by state-
imposed segregation is viewed in terms of specific educational
harm or in terms of a restriction on liberty is unimportant for
purposes of constitutional analysis. Under either analysis, the
interference with the interest in interracial association by
state-imposed segregation is unconstitutional under the
Brown-Boiling rationale, because it is not reasonably related
to any proper governmental objective.
2I Fiss, supra note 54, at 11.
265 Id. at 212.
266 See the discussion in Fiss, Racial Imbalance, supra note 164, at 594-95.
267 Cf. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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Regarding an explanation of Brown and Boiling in terms
of constitutional values, as observed earlier, state-imposed
segregation is inconsistent with both the value of racial equal-
ity and the value of black freedom, values which are embodied
in the Reconstruction Amendments.26 8 Going beyond the situ-
ation of state-imposed segregation, the value of racial equality
and the value of black freedom coalesce to make racial inte-
gration itself an important constitutional value. Thus, as the
Court recognized in Swann, a school district can assign stu-
dents on a racial basis for the purpose of achieving racially
integrated schools. 269 This idea was reinforced in Regents of
the University of California v. Bakke,270 in which the Court
held that a public university can use race-conscious criteria in
determining admission to its professional schools for the pur-
pose of achieving a racially diverse student body. 1 In other
words, because it is consistent with the constitutional value of
racial integration, the government can require that any activ-
ity or program it operates be administered on a racially inte-
grated basis.27 2
My approach to the question of the existence of a consti-
tutional right to attend a racially integrated school is based on
the Brown-Boiling rationale for invalidating state-imposed
segregation, as it relates to the constitutional values that are
implicated by required attendance at racially identifiable
schools. It is my submission that required attendance at ra-
cially identifiable schools resulting from the use of geographic
attendance zoning as the basis of student assignment cannot
be sustained under the Brown-Boiling rationale for invalidat-
ing state-imposed segregation and is inconsistent with the
constitutional values of racial equality, black freedom, and, of
course, racial integration itself.
If this submission is correct, the distinction between the
'" See text accompanying notes 253-56 supra for a discussion of these constitu-
tional values.
"' See note 56 supra for a discussion of this aspect of the Swann decision.
270 438 U.S. 265 (1979).
271 See Sedler, Beyond Bakke, supra note 2, at 157-59.
272 Id. at 159. A public housing authority, for example, could assign housing on a
racial basis to insure that all of the sites would be integrated. See Otero v. New York
Hous. Auth., 484 F.2d 1122 (2d Cir. 1973).
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segregation required by state law and the segregation that re-
sults from the use of geographic attendance zoning as the ba-
sis of student assignment relates only to the fact that the
state may be able to assert a justification for the segregation
produced by geographic attendance zoning that it cannot as-
sert for the segregation required by state law. But simply be-
cause the government can advance a justification for its action
does not, of course, resolve the constitutional question. When-
ever governmental action interferes with important interests
and implicates constitutional values, the Constitution requires
that there be a balancing of the conflicting interests in light of
those constitutional values.2  It is thus necessary to balance
the interests of children in attending racially integrated
schools against the interests asserted by the state in support
of the use- of geographic attendance zoning. The balancing
process, when undertaken in light of constitutional values, es-
tablishes that the constitutional balance must be struck in
favor of a right to attend a racially integrated school.
Looking first to the Brown-Boiling rationale, we see that
required attendance at racially identifiable schools interferes
with the interest of black and white children in associating
with each other during the educational process, causing them
specific educational harm.7 4 The interference with that inter-
est is necessarily the same whether the schools are racially
identifiable because state law mandates racial segregation or
because the state has used geographic attendance zoning,
13 For a general discussion of constitutional balancing, see P. BEST, PROCESSES
OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 987-96 (1975).
27' The ultimate harm is that it does not prepare them to live in a multiracial
society. While this harm may be more acute for black childen, since they are in the
minority and must learn to live in a white-dominated society, the harm is felt by
white children, too. See the discussion in Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ.,
383 F. Supp. 699, 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1974), aff'd, 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975). In terms of
learning how to live in a multiracial society, a school attended by children of both
races offers a very different learning experience than a racially identifiable school. As
to the importance of diversity in the educational process, see also Bakke, 438 U.S. at
311-14 (opinion of Powell, J.). As one commentator has observed: "The goal of the
desegregation process is a reasonable degree of social integration and a lack of overt
conflict whereby blacks and whites, given an objective important to both, can trust
each other and listen to each other sufficiently well to complete the task at hand,
whether it be a vocational task, an educational task or a political task." Cohen, The
Effects of Desegregation on Race Relations, 39 L. & CONTEP. PROB. 271, 273 (1975).
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which interacts with residential racial segregation to produce
racially identifiable schools." 5 The rationale of Brown-Boil-
ing, then, would indicate that required attendance at racially
identifiable schools, like required attendance at schools segre-
gated by law, is unconstitutional unless the use of geographic
attendance zoning advances some governmental interests,
which, on balance, outweigh the interest of black and white
children in associating with each other during the educational
process, and in deriving educational advantage from such in-
terracial association.
Since required attendance at racially identifiable schools
interferes with the interest in interracial association and
causes specific educational harm to black and white children,
a constitutional basis for recognition of a right to attend a ra-
cially integrated school can be predicated on the interference
with this interest and the causing of this specific educational
harm. It is unnecessary, therefore, in the constitutional analy-
sis, to consider whether such required attendance causes addi-
tional harm or in other respects denies equal educational op-
portunity. We need not consider, for example, whether
required attendance at racially identifiable schools produces
feelings of inferiority in black children in the same manner as
required attendance at de jure segregated schools.2 78 Nor are
we concerned with whether attendance at racially integrated
schools can be shown to improve the academic achievement of
black children in regard to the cognitive skills. While there is
substantial, although controverted, evidence showing that the
academic achievement levels of black children attending ra-
cially integrated schools are generally higher than the aca-
demic achievement levels of black children attending racially
identifiable schools,2 77 there is no evidence suggesting that the
275 The presence of a few children of the other race in the school is irrelevant,
because it does not obviate the absence of the opportunity for meaningful interracial
association.
"' We thus discard this part of the Brown holding for purposes of the present
constitutional analysis. Compare the earlier approach in Sedler, School Segregation,
supra note 53, at 254-56.
27 For a comprehensive review of the various studies, see Crain & Mahard, De-
segregation and Black Achievement: A Review of the Research, 42 L. & CoNTEmp.
PROB. 17 (1978).
1979-80]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 68
higher achievement level of black children attending racially
integrated schools is due to the racial mixture or to the pres-
ence of white children in the school as such.2 78 The interest-
harm predicate for recognition of a constitutional right to at-
tend a racially integrated school then, based on the Brown-
Bolling rationale, is the interest of black and white children in
interracial association during the educational process, and the
concomitant educational harm that is caused to black and
white children by the denial of the opportunity for interracial
association.
Required attendance at racially identifiable schools is, of
course, inconsistent with the constitutional value of racial in-
tegration, and that value is no less implicated when the racial
identifiability of the schools results from geographic attend-
ance zoning than when it results from state laws mandating
racial segregation. More significantly perhaps, required at-
tendance at racially identifiable schools strongly implicates
the basic values of racial equality and black freedom embod-
ied in the fourteenth amendment and the other Reconstruc-
278 Crain and Mehard, while concluding that the studies show overall achieve-
ment gains for black students attending racially integrated schools, note as follows:
All else being equal, will the mixing of races alone result in higher black
achievement? That question cannot be answered because in the real world
desegregation is never an "all else equal" situation. Desegregation some-
times results in better curricula or facilities; it often results in blacks having
better trained or more cognitively skilled teachers, it is frequently accompa-
nied by a major effort to upgrade the quality of education, and it almost
always results in socioeconomic desegregation. When desegregation is ac-
companied by all of these factors, it should not be surprising that there are
immediate achievement gains half to two-thirds of the time. This suggests
that desegregation is sufficient but not necessary to obtain these gains,
since there are other ways to achieve curriculum reform or better teaching
if the political will is present.
Id. at 49.
See also Hawley, The New Mythology of School Desegregation, 42 L. & CoNTEr,".
PROB. 217, 238-39 (1978). As pointed out previously, in Brown, the Court did not
make any finding to the effect that the academic achievement of black children at
racially integrated schools necessarily would be higher than the academic achieve-
ment of black children at racially segregated schools, and there would have been no
basis for making such a finding. See notes 214-15 supra and accompanying text.
Thus, as one commentator has noted, "making the case for desegregation... [hinge]
on whether it improves the achievement test scores of minority students is a far cry
from the rationale of Brown." Levin, Education, Life Chances, and the Courts; The
Role of Social Science Evidence, 39 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 217, 238-39 (1975).
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tion Amendments because it perpetuates and reinforces ghet-
toization and residential racial segregation, one of the most
pronounced consequences of the social history of racism in
this nation.279 Existing patterns of residential racial segrega-
tion and the ghettoization of American cities have been pro-
duced by a long history of massive racial discrimination on
the part of all components of the housing delivery system,2 8 0
and patterns of residential racial segregation, once estab-
lished, are highly resistant to change.28' When the state as-
signs children to school on the basis of where the children
live, therefore, it is necessarily incorporating the consequences
of a social history of racism into the educational process, and
residential racial segregation becomes reinforced and perpetu-
ated in school segregation. Precisely because blacks have been
confined to living in designated areas identified by the race of
the occupants, black children are assigned to schools, likewise
identified by the race of the students. While patterns of resi-
dential racial segregation cannot be uprooted by governmental
action, it is governmental action that transforms residential
racial segregation into school segregation and causes racially
identifiable schools to come into being. For the state to rein-
force and perpetuate this consequence of the social history of
racism implicates most strongly the constitutional values of
racial equality and black freedom.28 2
The constitutional basis for recognition of a substantive
right to attend a racially integrated school, then, is as follows.
Required attendance at a racially identifiable school interferes
2 As to the meaning of the "social history of racism in this Nation," see Sedler,
Beyond Bakke, supra note 2, at 135-41.
280 The housing delivery system refers to the process by which houses are built,
how they come on the market, and how they are bought, sold, and financed. The
government, the real estate industry, and the home financing industry are among the
various components of the housing delivery system.
2" In the first place, people make only a limited number of moves over a life-
time. Secondly, and perhaps more significant in this regard, people have become so
conditioned to relating race and residence, that a great number of persons would not
consider locating in places where the other race predominates or, in many instances,
even in places where there is some racial integration.
282 For the view that the government may not take action that perpetuates the
disadvantaged position of racially disadvantaged groups, see Fiss, Groups and the
Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL & PuB. AYF. 107, 157-59 (1976).
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with the interest of black and white children in interracial as-
sociation during the educational process and so causes them
to suffer specific educational harm. Such required attendance
is inconsistent with the constitutional value of racial integra-
tion, and more significantly, strongly implicates the basic con-
stitutional values of racial equality and black freedom by rein-
forcing and perpetuating residential racial segregation and
ghettoization. Therefore, it is submitted, there is a strong con-
stitutional justification for recognition of a substantive right
on the part of children to attend a racially integrated school.
In this connection, it may be noted that it is the required
attendance of children at racially identifiable schools that
goes to the essence of the constitutional claim. It is not con-
tended that the Constitution mandates that all of the schools
within a school system in fact be racially integrated. The dis-
tinction between the required attendance of children at ra-
cially identifiable schools and the operation of all schools on a
racially integrated basis is significant in terms of constitu-
tional analysis. It is the required attendance at racially identi-
fiable schools that interferes with the ability of black and
white children to associate with each other during the educa-
tional process and causes them to suffer specific educational
harm. It is also the required attendance at racially identifiable
schools that strongly implicates constitutional values.
Let us suppose that a school district operates two high
schools, both of which are centrally located in non-residential
areas. The students are permitted to choose the school they
wish to attend, and all students are provided the necessary
transportation to the school of their choice. Neither school is
enrolled at capacity and no student is denied a choice of
schools. It turns out that the enrollment at one school is
predominantly white and the enrollment at the other school is
predominantly black to the point that both schools would be
considered racially identifiable. Under the present analysis
the state would not be acting unconstitutionally here, because
no child is required to attend a racially identifiable school and
thus is not denied the opportunity for interracial association
during the educational process. And since the state is not us-
ing geographic attendance zoning, it is not implicating consti-
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tutional values by reinforcing and perpetuating ghettoization
and residential racial segregation. It is only the required as-
signment of children to racially identifiable schools then that
under this analysis may be violative of the Constitution.28 3
Required attendance at racially identifiable schools inter-
feres with interracial association during the educational pro-
cess and implicates constitutional values in the same manner
as state laws mandating racial segregation. If required attend-
ance at legally segregated schools, therefore, is unconstitu-
tional, but required attendance at racially identifiable schools
is not unconstitutional, it must be because, while state-re-
quired segregation cannot advance any valid governmental in-
terest,28 the state is able to set forth valid interests that are
advanced by geographic attendance zoning which, on balance,
outweigh the interests of children in attending racially inte-
grated schools. It is that question on which consideration now
must focus.
Geographic attendance zoning can be said to advance cer-
tain governmental interests related to the operation of "neigh-
borhood schools. '285 Geographic attendance zoning is the most
efficient method of assigning students to particular schools
and minimizes or reduces the amount of student transporta-
tion required..28  Any substantial departure from strict geo-
graphic attendance zoning likely will require at least some ad-
'M' By the same token, a school system would not be acting unconstitutionally
under the present analysis if it had systemwide open enrollment at all schools, pro-
viding transportation to any school a student wished to attend, notwithstanding that
some schools might turn out to be racially identifiable. It could be contended that
constitutional values preclude that state from operating any activity except on a ra-
cially integrated basis, where both blacks and whites participate in that activity, but
this conclusion would not follow from the present analysis.
2" See the text accompanying notes 285-97 infra for a discussion of governmen-
tal interests with regards to school segregation.
"0 In the school context, as Justice Powell has observed, "neighborhood school"
does not necessarily mean a "walk-in" school, but instead "refers to relative proxim-
ity, to a preference for a school nearer to, rather than more distant from, home."
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. at 245 n.25 (Powell, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part).
284 As the Court noted in Swann: "All things being equal, with no history of
discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their
home." 402 U.S. at 28. See also the discussion by Justice Powell in his separate opin-
ion in Keyes, 413 U.S. at 245-48.
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ditional student transportation which will increase operating
costs, and will either add to the length of the school day or
will reduce the portion of the school day that is devoted to
school activities. 87 The existence of "neighborhood schools" is
said to facilitate parental involvement in the schools and the
ability of the parent to get to the school sooner in the event of
an emergency.2 88 It has been contended that "neighborhood
schools" are desirable because they "reflect the deeply felt de-
sire of citizens for a sense of community in their public educa-
tion," and that, "[c]ommunity support, interest, and dedica-
tion to public schools may well run higher with a
neighborhood attendance pattern."2 9
These interests, however, apart from the "community
support" interest, are essentially "administrative conve-
nience" interests. It is more convenient for the school authori-
ties and for the students if the students are assigned to the
schools closest to their homes, but as evidenced by widespread
and ever-increasing student transportation throughout the
country, transporting students to school located some distance
from their homes is not considered to have an adverse effect
on the educational process.2 90 It may be more convenient for
parents to go to their children's school if that school is located
closer to home, but it is difficult to believe that if they are
otherwise disposed to become involved in the school, or that if
any emergency occurs, they will not travel to the school wher-
ever it is located. 91
It is these "administrative convenience" interests that
must be balanced against the interests of children in having
interracial associations during the educational process and the
educational advantage that derives from such association.
' See Id. See also Fiss, Racial Imbalance, supra note 164, at 566.
413 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part); Fiss, Racial
Imbalance, supra note 164, at 566.
289 413 U.S. at 246 (Powell, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
290 See the discussion in Hawley, supra note 278, at 224-26.
291 The essential premise of school consolidation-which is occurring at a high
rate in many school systems today because of declining enrollment-is that the loca-
tion of the school a particular child attends will not make any difference. And as a
practical matter, with an ever-increasing number of single parent and "two paycheck"
families, the parent is not likely to be at home in the case of an emergency anyway.
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"Administrative convenience" generally has not ranked very
high on the constitutional scale, for as the Court has noted,
"[t]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and
efficiency. ' 292 Moreover, the interests of children in having in-
terracial associations during the educational process is sup-
portive of the constitutional value of racial integration,29' and,
as pointed out previously, requiring children to attend racially
identifiable schools is inconsistent with the basic constitu-
tional values of racial equality and black freedom.294 While
"administrative convenience" may have relevance in some
contexts,29 5 it surely cannot begin to equal in constitutional
importance racial integration and interracial association dur-
ing the educational process.
The asserted "community support" interest is completely
speculative, since it is difficult to see any logical relationship
between the method of student assignment and community
support for the schools. What the asserted "community sup-
port" interest may really mean, however, is that people's sup-
port for the public schools is related to whether or not they
can determine the particular school that their children will at-
tend through their choice of residence. And, since residential
neighborhoods are largely racially and socially homogeneous,
what the state is saying is that people must be permitted to
have their children attend racially and socially homogeneous
schools as a condition for their support of the public schools.
A more patent inconsistency with the equality value of the
fourteenth amendment is difficult to imagine. There is no
"right" to attend a "neighborhood" or racially homogeneous
school,296 and the state cannot, consistent with constitutional
2 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972); see also Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
M' See notes 259-62 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the chil-
dren's interest.
" See notes 253-56 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of these two
values.
25 For example, administrative convenience is relevant in classifications to de-
termine eligibility for social welfare benefits. See Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495
(1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975); but "administrative convenience"
may not be relied on to support a gender-based classification, even with respect to
eligibility for social welfare benefits. Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
'" See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg School Dist., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). See also
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values, assert an interest that enables parents to avoid having
their children attend school with children of a different race
or socio-economic class.
It is submitted, therefore, that upon balancing the inter-
ests of children in attending racially integrated schools against
the state's interest in "administrative convenience" and "com-
munity support" in light of constitutional values, the balance
clearly must be struck in favor of the interest of interracial
association during the educational process. If this be so, the
Constitution must be interpreted to recognize a substantive
constitutional right of children to attend a racially integrated
school, and the state may not insist on geographic attendance
zoning to compel children to attend racially identifiable
schools.29 7
C. The Scope of the State's Obligation to Provide for
Attendance at a Racially Integrated School
This section of this writing examines the scope of the
state's obligation to implement the constitutional right to at-
tend a racially integrated school. Since the constitutional ba-
sis for the existence of the substantive right is not the state's
responsibility for the maintenance of a dual school system,
but the entitlement of children to attend a racially integrated
school, there is no concern with desegregation of the school
system. Rather, the question is whether the Constitution
requires the state to provide for attendance at racially inte-
grated schools for all children to the maximum extent feasi-
ble,298 or whether a lesser degree of obligation is constitution-
ally permissible.
The state's "minimum obligation" would be that outlined
by Justice Powell in Keyes in the context of defining a "genu-
inely integrated school system."29 9 Essentially what this
note 56 supra for additional authority.
29 This question, as noted, was specifically left open in Keyes. See note 186
supra.
298 The state must integrate schools to the maximum extent feasible when the
obligation is to eliminate all vestiges of de jure segregation. See notes 28 and 40
supra and accompanying text for a discussion of this obligation.
"2 See notes 176-79 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Justice
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means is that the school authorities would have to do every-
thing, short of extensive additional student transportation, to
achieve maximum racial integration. It would include the
redrawing of attendance zones with reference to the race of
the students who would be attending particular schools, split
zoning, making school construction and closure decisions, and
utilizing transportation, to the extent that it is provided, with
a view toward achieving integration. 300 Imposition of this
"minimum obligation" effectively would bring about desegre-
gation in the smaller urban school systems and would insure
that all children enrolled in such systems would be able to
attend a racially integrated school.
In larger urban areas, however, because of extensive resi-
dential racial segregation, the right to attend a racially inte-
grated school cannot be implemented for many children with-
out substantial additional student transportation.0 1 If that
right is to be fully implemented in those school systems,
therefore, the school authorities, as a practical matter, will
have to desegregate most of the schools in the school system
by student transportation in much the same manner as a
school system that is required to remedy systemwide de jure
segregation.0 2 The question then is whether the Constitution
imposes this kind of obligation on the state to implement the
substantive right to attend a racially integrated school.
This question, like the question relating to the existence
of the substantive right, must be approached in terms of bal-
ancing. It is necessary to balance the importance of the inter-
est of children in attending racially integrated schools against
the importance of the interests of the state that are adversely
affected by the requirement of substantial student transporta-
tion.303 The state would first contend that substantial student
Powell's opinion in Keyes.
300 This was my earlier view regarding the extent of the state's obligation to pro-
vide for attendance at racially integrated schools. See note 53 supra.
3o See 413 U.S. at 248-49.
1o2 See note 298 supra for a discussion of the maximum obligation of the state to
eliminate all vestiges of de jure segregation.
303 Cf. Fiss, supra note 54, at 15. ("The question that should be asked first is
whether the maintenance of segregated schools violates the Constitution. If so, then
what would be required is the elimination of that segregation or integration.")
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transportation imposes a "cost and disruption burden" on the
school system going beyond the "administrative convenience"
that is served by geographic attendance zoning. The costs may
be considerable in dollar terms, e4 and substantial student
transportation not only causes a good deal of "disruption" in
the school system as a whole, but can convert the school sys-
tem from a "walk-in" system to a "busing" system2 °
The second, and probably more significant objection
made by the state, is that substantial student transportation
for racial integration purposes will cause "white flight" from
the public schools. It is strongly maintained by school authori-
ties that substantial student transportation for racial integra-
tion purposes in urban school systems, which is likely to in-
clude the transporting of white students to schools located in
black residential areas, will significantly reduce the white en-
rollment of the school system. White parents whose children
are now enrolled in the system will either enroll their children
in private schools or relocate in the adjacent predominantly
white suburban districts, and white families with school age
children who are moving into the metropolitan area will be
more likely to locate in the suburban section of the area. The
end result, it is claimed, will be to make the urban school dis-
trict "blacker and poorer" and still will leave racially identifi-
able schools.30 6 The matter of "white flight" due to school de-
segregation has been the subject of considerable empirical
research.30 7 While there is disagreement over the extent of
"0 But the cost of such transportation still will be small in relation to the school
system's overall budget: on the average less than two percent. G. ORFrELD, MUsT WE
Bus 131 (1978) (quoting from SENATE SELECT COMMITrEE ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OP-
PORTUNrrY, TOWARD EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY, FINAL REPORT 92:2 at 208-09
(GPO 1972).
"05 However, as in the situation where the school authorities are required to rem-
edy de jure segregation, the time and distance of busing could not be so great as to
"either risk the health of the children or significantly impinge on the educational
process." Swann, 402 U.S. at 30-31.
306 This argument was recently advanced by Justice Powell in his dissent from
the dismissal of certiorari in Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of Dallas NAACP, 48
U.S.L.W. 4118, 4121-22 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1980).
a " The two most recent comprehensive studies are Rossell, School Desegregation
and Community Social Change, 42 L. & CONTE. PROB. 133 (1978); Armor, White
Flight, Demographic Transition, and the Future of School Desegregation (Aug.
1978) (paper presented at American Sociological Association Meetings). The various
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"white flight," particularly as to its long-term effect, it cannot
be disputed that an attempt to desegregate the schools by
substantial student transportation, including the transporta-
tion of white students to schools located in black residential
areas, will cause at least some reduction in the white enroll-
ment of the school system.308
Let us first consider the asserted interest in preventing
"white flight." It is submitted that this interest is a constitu-
tionally impermissible one and so cannot be interposed in the
balancing equation against full implementation of the right to
attend a racially integrated school. The Court has stated, in
the context of remedying de jure segregation, that a fear of
"white flight" cannot "be accepted as a reason for achieving
anything less than complete uprooting of the dual public
school system." 309 If this is true when the right involved is the
right to attend school in a school system in which there pres-
ently exist no vestiges of de jure segregation, it must be
equally so when the right involved is the right to attend a ra-
cially integrated school. The asserted interest in preventing
"white flight" amounts to nothing more than an accommoda-
tion of the racial prejudices and fears of white parents, and
any recognition of that interest is patently inconsistent with
constitutional values.3 10 "[T]he vitality of these constitutional
principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disa-
greement with them,"31 and if implementation of the right to
attend a racially integrated school results in a loss of students
to the school system, this is a price that the Constitution re-
quires the school system to bear. If the Constitution recog-
nizes a right to attend a racially integrated school, it also re-
other studies are cited and reviewed in the Rossell work.
318 This is indicated in all of the studies. Rossell, supra note 307, at 168-69. The
disagreement is over the long-term effect of "white flight" on the black-white compo-
sition of the district.
-1' United States v. Scotland Neck City Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484, 491 (1972).
310 The courts generally have been reluctant to take the possibility of "white
flight" into account even in the context of formulating particular desegregation reme-
dies. See the discussion and review of cases in Levin & Moise, supra note 260, at 93-
98.
311 Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955). See also Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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quires that so long as there are black and white students in
the school system, they must attend school together. The mat-
ter of "white flight" will be considered more fully in connec-
tion with the crossing of school district lines but the point to
be emphasized now is that the state cannot, in light of well-
settled constitutional principles, resist full implementation of
the right to attend a racially integrated school on the ground
that this will produce "white flight."
This analysis leaves the "cost and disruption" interest as
the only permissible interest to be asserted in the balancing
equation against full implementation of the right to attend a
racially integrated school. While this interest is not com-
pletely insubstantial, 12 it would not seem to be sufficient to
outweigh the interest of black and white children in interra-
cial association during the educational process, an interest
that is firmly rooted in and supportive of constitutional val-
ues. Again, if "cost and disruption" is not sufficient to inter-
pose against the required transportation of students when the
right involved is the right to attend school in a school system
in which there exist no vestiges of de jure segregation, it is
difficult to see why it should be sufficient to interpose when
the right involved is the right to attend a racially integrated
school. The "cost and disruption" interest is not qualitatively
different from the "administrative convenience" interest re-
lied on in the first instance to justify geographic attendance
zoning as the basis of student assignment. The difference be-
tween the two interests is one of degree, and it is not unrea-
sonable to expect a school system to bear the "cost and dis-
ruption" that is necessary to implement fully the con-
stitutional right to attend a racially integrated school. It is
submitted, therefore, that the state's constitutional obligation
is to provide for attendance at a racially integrated school to
the maximum extent feasible, and that it must furnish the
requisite student transportation to effectuate this obligation.
The next question for consideration is whether the state's
obligation to provide for attendance at racially integrated
312 See a discussion of this interest by Justice Powell in his separate opinion in
Keyes, 413 U.S. at 248-52.
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schools to the maximum extent feasible is circumscribed by
the existence of separate school districts established pursuant
to state law. As discussed previously,313 the Court's holding in
Milliken I with respect to the remedial powers of the federal
courts to impose interdistrict desegregation orders was based
on the premise that the substantive right related to the situa-
tion prevailing in the school system in which the child was
enrolled, and that there was no substantive right to attend a
racially integrated school. Once it is recognized that the sub-
stantive right is the right to attend a racially integrated
school, the holding and rationale of Milliken I necessarily are
inapplicable. The issue becomes whether, in the interdistrict
context, the state can assert interests that, on balance, out-
weigh the interests of children in having interracial associa-
tions during the educational process and the educational
benefit they derive from attending racially integrated schools.
The matter of crossing school district lines would arise in
the case of urban school systems that have become so heavily
black in enrollment that even with the maximum disperse-
ment of white students, it would not be possible to integrate
very many schools in the urban system alone.3 14 These sys-
tems, of course, are surrounded by predominantly or virtually
all-white school systems in which, even with the maximum
dispersement of black students, it would not be possible to
integrate very many schools in those systems. We are assum-
ing for purposes of this analysis that interdistrict desegrega-
tion would be fully practicable; that is, that the time and dis-
tance involved in student transportation between the urban
and suburban districts would be substantially the same as
that involved in student transportation within a large urban
district or a consolidated district.3 15
The interest that the state would interpose in opposition
3"' See notes 141-46 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of Milliken I.
314 Because of the substantially predominant white to black ratio of the metro-
politan area as a whole, a school with a very high proportion of black students in the
urban school system would be perceived objectively as a racially identifiable black
school notwithstanding the presence of some whites. See note 3 supra and accompa-
nying text for further discussion of this definition.
315 See note 145 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the Milliken I
dissents regarding transporting students for purposes of interdistrict desegregation.
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to interdistrict desegregation presumably would be the inter-
est of the local autonomy of the separate school districts,
which, the state would contend, would be adversely affected
by the interdistrict assignment of students. In Milliken I and
in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,310
the Court indicated that this interest was one that was enti-
tled to considerable weight. The Court in Milliken I stated
that "no single tradition in public education is more deeply
rooted than local control over the operation of the schools. 317
And in Rodriguez, the Court stated that local control over the
educational process affords citizens "the opportunity . . . for
participation in the decisionmaking process," permits "[e]ach
locality. . . to tailor local programs to local needs," and en-
courages "experimentation, innovation, and a healthy compe-
tition for educational excellence." 31 8 Of the interests asserted
thus far by the state as bases for avoiding the obligation to
provide for attendance at racially integrated schools to the
maximum extent feasible, the interest in local autonomy is
clearly the most significant.
Local autonomy, however, as related to local control over
the educational process and the operation of the schools, need
not be affected adversely in any way by interdistrict desegre-
gation and can be protected in the particular interdistrict de-
segregation plan that is adopted. The plan could leave ex-
isting school districts intact and assign the children across the
boundaries of those districts, with each child attending school
for some of the years in the "home" district and for some of
the years in the "receiving" district.1 ' The parents from the
"sending" district could be involved with the schools in the
"receiving" district during the years when their children were
attending school in that district. The "sending" and "receiv-
ing" districts also could cooperate in maintaining curricular
16 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
317 418 U.S. at 741.
"' 411 U.S. at 49-50.
819 In the Louisville-Jefferson County litigation, although the city system was
merged into the county system, the concept of "home school" and "receiving school,"
with the students attending each school for some of their school years, was incorpo-
rated into the desegregation plan. See Cunningham v. Grayson, 541 F.2d 538 (6th Cir.
1976).
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consistency. There also could be a metropolitan authority that
would be responsible for the assignment of students and the
coordination of the desegregation program. In addition, most
states have established procedures for the reorganization of
school districts through consolidation, merger or annexation.
Existing school districts could be reorganized through such
procedures, so that local control would be preserved in the re-
organized district.32 0 The point to be emphasized is that in-
terdistrict desegregation is in no way inconsistent with local
control over education, and local control can be preserved in
the particular desegregation plan that is adopted. This being
so, the local autonomy interest cannot properly be interposed
against interdistrict desegregation when desegregation is nec-
essary so that the rights of all the children in the metropolitan
area to attend a racially integrated school can be implemented
fully.
The interest in the local autonomy of the separate school
districts, however, may be seen as going beyond local control
and relating to the perceived advantages for the students cur-
rently enrolled in the suburban school districts.3 21 Those dis-
tricts are generally racially and socially homogeneous, and the
residents of those districts "may be willing to tax themselves
at a higher rate, knowing that the money will be spent for the
education of their own children and not for the education of
lower-income children. '3 22 Interdistrict desegregation will re-
sult in the abolition of the present racially and socially homo-
geneous schools and will require at least some degree of shar-
ing of educational resources between the urban and suburban
school districts. If local autonomy relates to the perceived ad-
vantages for the students currently enrolled in the suburban
school districts, then local autonomy clearly will be adversely
affected by interdistrict desegregation.2 3
Recognition of the interest in local autonomy in this
31o See generally Taylor, Metropolitan Remedies for Public School Discrimina-
tion: The Neglected Option, 10 UnB. REv. 184, 187-190 (1977). See also the discus-
sion of the "myth" of local control in Levin & Moise, supra note 260, at 111-14.
321 See Sedler, supra note 7, at 552-53.
32 Id. at 553.
31. Id. at 553-54.
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sense is clearly constitutionally impermissible. It would mean
that the white children who were living in the suburban
school districts would for this reason avoid association with
the black children who live in the urban school district during
the educational process.32 4 Since the state cannot affirmatively
act to enable whites to avoid association with blacks in public
facilities, 25 it cannot assert an interest related to enabling
whites to avoid interrracial association in opposition to its ob-
ligation to provide for attendance at racially integrated
schools.
It is submitted, therefore, that the state cannot advance
any valid local autonomy interest that would be adversely af-
fected by interdistrict desegregation. This being so, the state's
obligation to provide for attendance at racially integrated
schools cannot be circumscribed by the existence of separate
school districts.
A final point in consideration of the scope of the state's
obligation to provide for attendance at a racially integrated
school concerns the impact of anticipated "white flight" on
the implementation of that obligation. While, as discussed
previously, the asserted interest in preventing "white flight"
properly cannot be interposed against the state's obligation to
provide for attendance at racially integrated schools to the
maximum extent feasible,s26 the fact that desegregation is
likely to cause some reduction in the white enrollment of the
school system may be relevant to a determination of precisely
how the state's obligation is to be implemented in a particular
situation. It is clear that "white flight" is directly related to
the black proportion of the school system and to the propor-
tion of white students who must be reassigned to schools lo-
324 As emphasized, the right to interracial association during the educational pro-
cess is a right that belongs to white children as well at to black children. Here, how-
ever, the parents of white children and possibly the children themselves do not wish
to exercise that right and are in effect asserting a right not to associate with black
children during the educational process.
325 See notes 242-45 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the lack of
a constitutional recognition for the right of whites to avoid associations with blacks.
326 See notes 306-11 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the state's
interest in avoiding "white flight."
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cated in black residential areas.327 This being so, "white
flight". is most pronounced in urban school systems sur-
rounded by accessible white suburbs and least pronounced in
large metropolitan systems surrounded by minimally devel-
oped rural areas.328 It could be contended, therefore, that
where the black proportion of a school system is sufficiently
high, so that, in view of anticipated "white flight," it will not
be possible to integrate effectively many schools in the sys-
tem, at least for very long, an interdistrict desegregation rem-
edy should be imposed instead of limiting desegregation to
the urban system alone.
It is submitted, however, that the court should not take
into account anticipated "white flight" in formulating the ini-
tial desegregation remedy, because the court is not foreclosed
from imposing an interdistrict remedy subsequently, should
this become necessary. Since the nature of the substantive
right relates to attendance at a racially integrated school
rather than to the existence of de jure segregation in the
school system, the corresponding obligation of the state to
provide for attendance at a racially integrated school is ongo-
ing and would not be terminated at the time the initial deseg-
regation plan went into effect. Under the present state of the
law, since the obligation is to eliminate all vestiges of de jure
segregation in the school system, the state satisfies its obliga-
tion when those vestiges are eliminated and it is not required
to take any further action when subsequent population shifts
result in schools again becoming racially identifiable.2 9 But
where the nature of the substantive right gives rise to an
ongoing obligation, if subsequent population shifts make it
impossible to achieve effective desegregation within the urban
district alone, the court can then impose an interdistrict rem-
edy in order to implement fully the substantive right.
This is the wiser course of action to follow, since the long-
term extent of "white flight" resulting from school desegrega-
tion is unclear.330 Even data purporting to establish the exis-
327 See Rossell, supra note 307, at 154.
329 See Armor, supra note 307, at 9, 18.
321 Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
"10 Dr. Armor maintains that there is a significant long-term effect. As he states:
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tence of long-term "white flight" show that its effect on the
white enrollment of the school system is not that great. For
example, in a recent study surveying a number of school sys-
tems in which long-term "white flight" is claimed to have oc-
curred, the highest percentage loss of white students in any
school system-the difference between the projected and ac-
tual white percentage of the school system-was only sixteen
percent."' Such a percentage decline is not likely in most
school systems to make the proportion of white students too
low to integrate effectively most of the schools in the sys-
tem.3 3 2 As a practical matter, long-term "white flight" due to
The effect is strongest in the first year of desegregation, with average white
losses accelerating by factors of 2 to 4 in most cases. But the projections
also show that many districts suffer anticipatory white losses, usually be-
tween the initial legal activities and the actual start of desegregation. More
important, the method also shows that in most districts the accelerated
white losses last for prolonged periods up to four or five years or more.
Sometimes these longer-term effects are boosted by subsequent court ac-
tions taken to broaden desegregation. . . It is important to stress that not
all white losses are attributable to the court actions. . . Nonetheless, the
extra white losses caused by court-ordered mandatory desegregation are
very substantial, in most cases amounting to over half of all white losses
over periods of six to eight years.
Armor, supra note 307, at 41. Rossell, however, contends that:
Analysis of the long term effect in a sample of 113 school districts indicates
that the implementation year effect is offset in postimplementation years in
less than normal white enrollment losses. . . . Secondly, the effect of deseg-
regation on white enrollment is negative only in the year of implementation
and the first postdesegregation year. There is a positive relationship be-
tween the extent of desegregation in the year the plan is implemented
(T + 0) and changes in white enrollment by the end of the second year of
the plan (T + 2). In other words, the greater the amount of desegregation
when the plan is initially implemented, the smaller the decline in white
enrollment two years later.
Rossell, supra note 307, at 163-64.
"I Armor, supra note 307, at 32.
332 It will be recalled that the definition of a racially integrated school utilized
herein is a school where a substantial number of black students and a substantial
number of white students are in attendance and does not depend on any racial ratio.
See notes 3-6 supra and accompanying text. It may also be noted in this connection
that even with extensive "white flight," desegregation accomplishes the objective of
substantially increasing interracial association during the educational process. As
Professor Rossell explains:
The evidence indicates that every desegregation plan, even the most ex-
tensive, has a net benefit-that is, benefits exceed costs. Paradoxically the
net benefit in black interracial contact with whites is greatest in school dis-
RIGHT TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
school desegration will only be a problem when there is also a
significantly greater loss of white students than black students
due to differential birth rates, so that the school system be-
comes heavily black. If and when this occurs, the court can
then impose an interdistrict remedy.
D. The New Right
Previous sections of this article have set forth the justifi-
cation for recognition of a substantive constitutional right to
attendance at a racially integrated school and have defined
the scope of the state's obligation to implement that right. It
may be queried how recognition of a substantive right to at-
tend a racially integrated school would affect the Court's pre-
sent doctrine with respect to school desegregation, which is
predicated on the existence of a right to attend school in a
school system in which there presently exist no vestiges of de
jure segregation. It would not affect existing court-ordered de-
segregation plans, since the scope of the state's obligation is
the same under either theory of the nature of the substantive
right: to achieve the greatest degree of actual desegregation,
taking into account the practicalities of the situation.3 3 3 It
would change the present state of the law with respect to the
imposition of interdistrict desegregation remedies, since it
would require the crossing of school district lines where this is
necessary to effectively desegregate the schools in the urban
tricts with 35 percent or more black enrollment, despite the fact that when
desegregation occurs these school districts undergo the greatest declines in
white enrollment. In short, even the most extensive plan is effective in ob-
taining the instrumental goal of black interracial contact with whites, and
this net benefit continues at least as long as four years after implementa-
tion of the desegregation plan.
The Coleman study found very much the same thing. Its equations show
that school districts that desegregate have, at the end of a ten-year period
after desegregation, a level of interracial contact (proportion white in the
average black child's school) that is still twice that of school districts that
have not desegregated, despite a greater decline in white enrollment com-
pared to those districts that did not desegregate during that period.
Rossell, supra note 307, at 167.
3' See notes 29-40 supra and accompanying text; note 123 supra and accompa-
nying text; and notes 301-12 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the
state's obligations under both theories.
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district without regard to the strictures of Milliken L Most
importantly perhaps, it would bring about desegregation in
school systems where de jure segregation cannot be shown.
The present and proposed doctrines could come into con-
flict in a case involving a school system where the matter of de
jure segregation has not yet been litigated. There would be a
question as to whether the plaintiffs could proceed on the the-
ory that the system is de jure segregated, if they choose, or
whether they would be compelled to proceed on the theory of
a substantive right to attend a racially integrated school. This
question could be important because of the entitlement to col-
lateral relief on the part of the plaintiff class where de jure
segregation can be shown. 34 It could be contended that the
plaintiffs should be able to proceed on either theory, thus ena-
bling them to obtain collateral relief. On the other hand, if
there is a substantive right to attend a racially integrated
school, it could be contended that the existence of de jure seg-
regation is now irrelevant, since the nature of the substantive
right now relates to attendance at a racially integrated school,
and the new theory supplants the old. Further analysis of this
question would seem premature until the new theory is recog-
nized by the Court.
CONCLUSION
At the present time, children have a substantive right to
attend school in a school system in which there presently exist
no vestiges of de jure segregation. They have no right to at-
tend a racially integrated school. The ability of a child to at-
tend a racially integrated school in practice then depends on
the situation prevailing in the school system in which the
child is enrolled, and under the de jure segregation doctrine,
will depend in large part on what happened in the school sys-
tem before the child was born.
This writing has set forth a justification for recognition of
a substantive constitutional right to attend a racially inte-
grated school. The source of this right was found in constitu-
tional values and it was maintained that, in light of those val-
"" Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
[Vol. 68
RIGHT TO SCHOOL DESEGREGATION
ues, the interest of black and white children in associating
with each other during the educational process is constitution-
ally more important than the "administrative convenience"
interest that is served by geographic attendance zoning. It
also was contended that the Constitution requires the state to
provide for attendance at racially integrated schools to the
maximum extent feasible, including, where necessary, the as-
signment of students across existing school district lines.
If such a right and corresponding obligation are recog-
nized by the Court, it will at last come to pass that black and
white children will be going to school together, which, "in the
final analysis is what desegregation of the public schools is all
about.,33 5
335 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 802 (1974) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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